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ABSTRACT 
 
Remittances: Determinants, Motivations and Effects. (December 2007) 
Georges Sami Naufal, B.A., American University of Beirut 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Manuelita Ureta 
                                                      Dr. Donald Deere  
 
 This dissertation examines the determinants, motivations and effects of 
remittances. In that last two decades remittances have gained interest due to their large 
size. For several developing countries remittances constitute a large portion of their 
gross domestic product and sometimes exceed foreign direct investment. In the first 
essay, I use a unique data set from Nicaragua to asses the behavior of persons who send 
money back home. I estimate a heteroskedastic Tobit with a known form of variance to 
estimate the correlation of the remitting decisions of migrants. Working, residing in a 
developed country and belonging to the nuclear family positively affect remittances. The 
labor status and the level of education of the head of the household both affect 
remittances. The decision to participate in the remitting process appears to be positively 
related across migrants within the same receiving household.  
 The second essay presents a simple theoretical model of migrants' remitting 
behavior. I consider two general motivations for remitting: altruism and self-interest. 
From the same data set used in the first chapter, I estimate a heteroskedastic Tobit and a 
sample selection equation to empirically test the findings of the theoretical model. 
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Evidence suggests that migrants from Nicaragua remit for altruistic reasons. Moreover 
some gender heterogeneity exists in the remitting behavior.  
In the last essay, I study the impact of remittances on a small open economy 
using a stochastic limited participation model with cash in advance constraints and 
costly adjustment of cash holdings.  I examine the impact of remittances on the steady 
state of the economy and on the dynamic response of variables to money shocks, output 
shocks, and shocks to remittance flows. I also examine the impact on dynamic responses 
to shocks of alternative specifications regarding the initial impact of a monetary 
injection or a remittances shock on the economy.  I find that a positive remittances shock 
forces the exchange rate to depreciate and lowers both output and consumption in the 
period of the shock, irrespective of adjustment costs on money balances. Also, the 
positive remittance shock lowers utility during the period of the shock but improves it 
thereafter. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
  INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation examines the determinants, motivations and effects of 
remittances. In that last two decades remittances have gained interest due to their 
continuous increase and their large size. For several developing countries remittances 
constitute a large portion of their gross domestic product and sometimes exceed foreign 
direct investment. Official estimates show that remittances averaged around 60 billion 
U.S. dollars per year in the 1990s (World Bank) and reached 167 billion U.S. dollars in 
2005 (World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects). In some countries remittances 
constitute a significant share of gross domestic product (GDP) (Connell and Brown, 
2004; De Haas, 2006; Heilmann, 2006; Chami et al., 2006). For instance, in Nicaragua, 
the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere (www.worldbank.org/ni), remittances 
constitute around 16% of its GDP, the fifth highest percentage among the developing 
country recipients of workers’ remittances in 2001.   
The growing importance of these transfers of money has produced a number of 
studies to explore their dimensions, determinants, effects and the government policies 
designed to influence them. Remittances gain their significance not just from their size 
but from the potential and actual effects of these money flows on both the society and 
the individual. Remittances affect labor market decisions; school retention levels, export 
sector competitiveness, and can create moral hazard problems (Funkhouser, 1992; 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Development Economics. 
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 Glytsos, 2002; Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Chami et 
al., 2005). 
All these studies stress on better understanding the remittance behavior in order 
to develop economic policies that take full advantage of these flows. 
In the next chapter, I use a unique data set from Nicaragua to asses the 
characteristics of the individuals who remit. Unlike all previous studies I have 
information on the sender and the receiver from the same source. I estimate a 
heteroskedastic Tobit with a known form of heteroskedasticity which allows me to 
examine the correlation of the remitting decisions of migrants in the same original 
receiving household.1 The main contribution of this paper is the ability to quantify the 
correlation of the remitting decisions between migrants who belong to the same 
receiving household. The ability to measure this relationship is crucial since it allows 
further understanding of how intra-family decisions are made regarding the allocation of 
resources across households that are separated by migration. The knowledge of the 
mechanism of intra-family remitting decisions shed light on the indirect outcomes of 
remittance policies. I believe this is the first paper to address this issue. This paper also 
adds to the remittance literature in computing changes in both the likelihood of remitting 
and the amount remitted.  
Gender, labor force status, and destination of the migrant all have significant 
effects on remittances. The relationship of the migrant to the head of the household also 
affects the remitting behavior. The labor status and the level of education of the head of 
                                                 
1 The receiving household is the original household in Nicaragua which reported at least one migrant 
living abroad. 
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the receiving household influence the migrant’s decision to participate in the remitting 
behavior. Evidence suggests that there is a positive correlation between migrants’ 
remitting decisions among migrants belonging to the same receiving household. 
 In Chapter III, I investigate the motivation behind remittances. Remittances 
differ from other types of capital flows. Capital flows such as FDIs are in general profit 
driven and therefore are positively related to GDP growth. However, this is not always 
the case for remittances. Remittances are not always profit driven and can be 
altruistically motivated. Also, FDIs tend to be less stable relative to remittances (Orozco, 
2002).  
 Uncovering the reasons for remitting is crucial for policy implication for several 
reasons. From the original household perspective, the forces behind remittances can shed 
some light on households’ migration strategies (De La Brière et al., 2002). In fact 
Hoddinott (1994) stresses that remittances should be incorporated in the model of 
household migration decisions. From a macroeconomic look, remittances are thought to 
be intended to ease the burden of poor economic performance on local recipients (Chami 
et al., 2005). Therefore altruistically motivated remittances are expected to be 
countercyclical with income growth and consequently can decrease the scope of the 
government intervention in recession times. In this particular case, policies built on 
predictions that remittances behave in the same manner as other types of capital flows 
might have unanticipated consequences. 
I present a simple theoretical model of remittance behavior. I consider 
remittances as unidirectional flows from the migrant in a host country to the original 
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household in the home country which I refer to in this paper as the receiving household. 
This allows me to consider the reaction of remittances to a bad state outcome on the 
receiving household. This is the first paper that looks at the response of remittances to 
shocks that pertain to the receiving household. This is crucial in terms of investigating 
the remittance behavior since most remittances consider the migrant as a source and the 
receiving household as the end destination and therefore, they are expected to react to 
any income shocks at the receiving end. This setup gives two broad motivations for 
remitting: altruism where migrants simply care about the receiving household members’ 
welfare and self-interest where migrants remit for investment opportunities that are 
expected to yield a certain payoff in the future. I test the theoretical predictions of this 
model using survey data from Nicaragua. I quantify the results of the heteroskedastic 
Tobit for policy purposes.  
Altruism seems to be the main motivation behind the remitting behavior to 
Nicaragua. Moreover the remitting behavior is not identical across gender. Female 
migrants seem to behave more altruistically toward the receiving household. 
 The literature on the macroeconomic impact of remittances on the recipient 
country is sparse. Chapter IV explores the impact of remittances flows on output, 
consumption, interest and exchange rates in the recipient country. In particular, I 
explicitly model remittances in a small open economy and analyze the impact of shocks 
to money, remittances and output.  I expand a limited participation model that requires 
that money balances be held to finance certain types of purchases and agents incur 
adjustment costs on money holdings. These two requirements generate a large and 
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persistent liquidity effect consistent with the stylized facts (Hairault et al., 2004). The 
impact of the adjustment costs on the predetermined allocation of money cash available 
for consumption is then analyzed to see how the main real variables of the economy 
respond to a remittances shock. 
One of the contributions of this Chapter is the ability to examine the dynamic 
response of major macroeconomic variables to remittances shock. Another important 
contribution is the capacity to observe the impact on the main economic variables when I 
allow for different end uses of remittances, and monetary injections. In fact, many 
domestic governments are interested in developing policy tools to direct a portion of 
remittances towards investment (The New York Times Magazines April 22, 2007). I 
distinguish between the direct effect of remittances on output through investment and the 
indirect effect through consumption and its multiplier effect. Being able to distinguish 
the end use of remittances is crucial in looking at the final effect on output in the 
economy (Burgess and Haksar, 2005; Heilmann, 2006; Sayan, 2006). This Chapter also 
presents a welfare analysis of remittances shock and investigates how remittances affect 
the utility of the representative agent. 
Positive remittances shock forces the exchange rate to depreciate and lowers both 
output and consumption in the period of the shock, irrespective of adjustment costs on 
money balances. Also, the positive remittance shock lowers utility during the period of 
the shock but improves it thereafter. 
Finally, Chapter V summarizes and concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
WHO REMITS? THE CASE OF NICARAGUA 
 
2.1. Introduction and Motivation 
   
International estimates of official remittances flows suggest that total remittances 
averaged around US$ 59 billion per year during the 1990s2 (World Bank). Fig. 2.1 ranks 
the first 20 developing country recipients of workers’ remittances by size of remittances 
received in 2001.  
 
Top 20 Developing-Country Recipients of Workers' Remittances 2001
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook 
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    Fig. 2.1 Top 20 Developing-Country Recipients of Workers’ Remittances by Size of Remittances 
 
                                                 
2  Most estimates of remittances are based on the balance of payments statistics reported to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Note that these numbers are generally an underestimate of the actual 
remittances since they only include the official flows of this money into the receiving countries. 
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Out of the first 20 developing countries receiving remittances six are from 
Central and South America with a total of 18.5 billion U.S. dollars.  In some countries 
remittances constitute a significant share of gross domestic product (GDP). Fig. 2.2 
ranks the first 20 developing country recipients of workers’ remittances by percentage of 
their GDP.  
 
Top 20 Developing-Country Recipients of Workers' Remittances 2001
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook
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   Fig. 2.2. Top 20 Developing-Country Recipients of Workers’ Remittances by Percentage of GDP 
 
 
Remittances constitute more than 10% of the GDP in twelve developing 
countries. In Nicaragua, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere (World Bank 
Website www.worldbank.org), remittances constitute around 16% of its GDP, the fifth 
highest percentage among the developing country recipients of workers’ remittances in 
2001.  The growing importance of these transfers of money has produced a number of 
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studies to explore their dimensions, determinants, effects and the government policies 
designed to influence them. Migrant remittances affect the performance of the economy. 
Glytsos (2002) shows that remittances have the potential to substitute for foreign aid. 
Chami et al. (2003) find that remitting takes place under asymmetric information and 
imply that remittances have a negative impact on economic growth. Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo (2004) find that workers’ remittances can reduce the international 
competitiveness of the receiving countries’ export sector by appreciating the real 
exchange rate in the receiving economies. Remittances also impact the behavior at the 
household level. Funkhouser (1992) finds opposite effects of remittances inflows on the 
Nicaraguan and Salvadorian labor markets. Edwards and Ureta (2003) find that 
remittances have a large effect on school retention. All these studies stress on better 
understanding the remittance behavior in order to develop economic policies that take 
full advantage of these flows. 
In this study I use a unique data set from Nicaragua to asses the characteristics of 
the individuals who remit. Unlike all previous studies I have information on the sender 
and the receiver from the same source. I estimate a heteroskedastic Tobit with a known 
form of heteroskedasticity which allows me to examine the correlation of the remitting 
decisions of migrants in the same original receiving household.3 The main contribution 
of this paper is the ability to quantify the correlation of the remitting decisions between 
migrants who belong to the same receiving household. The ability to measure this 
relationship is crucial since it allows further understanding of how intra-family decisions 
                                                 
3 In this paper the receiving household is the original household in Nicaragua which reported at least one 
migrant living abroad. 
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are made regarding the allocation of resources across households that are separated by 
migration. The knowledge of the mechanism of intra-family remitting decisions shed 
light on the indirect outcomes of remittance policies. I believe this is the first paper to 
address this issue. This paper also adds to the remittance literature in computing changes 
in both the likelihood of remitting and the amount remitted.  
Gender, labor force status, and destination of the migrant all have significant 
effects on remittances. The relationship of the migrant to the head of the household also 
affects the remitting behavior. The labor status and the level of education of the head of 
the receiving household influence the migrant’s decision to participate in the remitting 
behavior. Evidence suggests that there is a positive correlation between migrants’ 
remitting decisions among migrants belonging to the same receiving household.  
Section 2.2 below provides an overview of the existing literature. Section 2.3 
consists of a theoretical model. Section 2.4 describes the data and the methodology. 
Section 2.5 contains the results and section 2.6 summarizes and concludes. 
2.2. Literature Review 
 
Lucas and Stark (1985) discuss several hypotheses for motivations to remit. The 
authors present three reasons for remitting ranging from pure altruism to pure self-
interest spanning a more tempered point of view combining these two extremes. Lucas 
and Stark explore these concepts using data from the National Migration Study of 
Botswana. Remittances are determined partly by the earnings of the migrant and partly 
by his years of schooling. Lucas and Stark also note a positive trend between these flows 
of money and per capita income of the household. 
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Oberai and Singh (1980) using a household survey in the Ludhiana district of the 
Indian Punjab report a positive relation between low income migrant and the probability 
of remittances and a negative correlation between the number of household members 
working and this same likelihood. In addition, the authors find that the level of education 
does not affect the decision whether or not to remit. 
Based on a nationwide survey of households in Kenya, Knowles and Anker 
(1981) present empirical evidence on issues related to remittances. The authors first 
stress that remittances are primarily limited to members of the nuclear family. Moreover 
they conclude that migrant’s income of the sending unit, education level, sex, ownership 
of a house back home and the fact of a spouse residing away all positively affect the 
probability to remit. Knowles and Anker add that the length of time a migrant has 
resided away negatively affect these chances. Also migrant’s schooling and income 
negatively influence the level of remittances. 
Funkhouser (1995) uses data from El Salvador and Nicaragua to investigate and 
compare the determinants of remittances in both countries. Funkhouser applies a 
separable utility function that values both absentee’s utility and the household utility. 
The author also follows a linear functional form in estimating remittances. Funkhouser 
presents fairly similar findings for El Salvador and Nicaragua. In both countries 
education is negatively related to the probability of remittances while it is positively 
associated to the level of these money transfers. Using the Salvadoran data Funkhouser 
notes that age and gender do not affect the likelihood and the level of remittances. In 
Nicaragua, age is adversely correlated with both the probability and the amount of 
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remittances. Furthermore, Funkhouser examines familial relationship and the period of 
time spent abroad and their effects on remittances. 
Rodriguez (1996) uses a data set from the Philippines to note a positive 
connection between the age of the migrant, time since migration and the chance of 
remitting. However, equally to Knowles and Anker this incidence decreases for long 
absences. Rodriguez also remarks that being a member of the nuclear family increases 
the probability of remitting. Similarly to Oberai and Singh, Rodriguez does not find a 
clear association relating education to remittances. 
Lianos (1997) focuses on the remittances to Greece from Germany for a period 
of 30 years. Lianos tests the significance of a set of factors in terms of their effects on 
remittances. The author finds that the level of migrant’s income has a positive and major 
effect on remittances to Greece. Lianos also calculates the elasticity of remittances with 
respect to income. This elasticity is greater than one suggesting a large response of 
remittances for any small change in income. Furthermore, Lianos finds that household 
income in the country of origin does not significantly influence the level of remittances. 
Clearly, the empirical evidence on the determinants of remittances is 
inconclusive. I summarize these findings in Table 2.1.  
Both Oberai and Singh (1980) and Rodriguez (1996) find that education and 
remittances are not related. Lucas and Stark (1985) along with Knowles and Anker 
(1981) find a relationship between these two even though they do not agree on its 
direction. In addition, Lianos (1997) finds that household income is uncorrelated with 
remittances while Lucas and Stark (1985) document a positive correlation. These results 
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support a need for more empirical studies on the determinants of remittances. The 
following section outlines a theoretical model of remittance behavior.  
 
 
 
Table 2.1 
Summary of the Literature Findings 
Authors Data Findings 
Oberai and 
Singh (1980) 
 
 
Rural Household Survey in 
the Ludhiana District of the 
Indian Punjab (March – April 
1977) 
Years of schooling do not affect the prob. and the 
level of remittances. Migrant’s income has a 
positive effect on the probability of remittances. 
The number of working household members 
negatively affects this likelihood. 
Knowles and 
Anker (1981) 
Household Survey in Kenya 
(December 1974) 
Male, gender and years of schooling have a 
positive effect on the probability of remitting. 
Migrant’s income and receiving household’s 
income have a negative effect on this likelihood. 
Lucas and Stark 
(1985) 
Household Survey of 
Migration in Botswana (1978 
– 1979) 
Years of schooling, migrant’s income and the 
receiving household’s income positively affect the 
level of remittances. 
Funkhouser 
(1995) 
El Salvador: Survey 
conducted by Segundo 
Montes (1987) 
Nicaragua: Household 
Survey in Managua 
(December 1989) 
El Salvador: Age and gender have no effect on 
the probability and the level of remittances while 
years of schooling have an adverse effect on the 
likelihood of remitting and a positive effect on the 
level of remittances. 
Nicaragua: Age negatively affects the prob. and 
the level of remittances. Gender has no significant 
effect on remittances. Years of schooling have an 
adverse effect on the likelihood of remitting and a 
positive effect on the level of remittances. 
Rodriguez 
(1996) 
Survey of Overseas 
Philippians workers (SOW – 
1991) 
Age, years since migration, relationship to HH 
positively affect the probability of remitting. Age 
and years since migration negatively affect the 
level of remittances. Years of schooling have no 
effect on the level of remittances. 
Lianos (1997) Statistical Data come from 
diverse sources 
Migrant’s income positively affects the level of 
remittances. The receiving household’s income 
has no effect on the level of remittances. 
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2.3. Model 
This paper builds on the model in Funkhouser (1995). A model of remittance 
behavior considers an emigrant’s utility that is a function of his own utility and that of 
the receiving household in the home country. I assume a separable utility function given 
by:                                                                                                                                                                     
                 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }jjjijijjij ZCUVCUUU ,;U +=                                                           (2.1) 
where U and U ;  refers to a particular migrant  and  refers 
to a specific receiving household, U  is emigrant  own utility which depends on 
consumption , U  refers to the receiving household  utility which depends on its 
consumption  and  defines a vector that includes the receiving household 
characteristics.  
0;0;0 '''' <>> ijjij UU
ijC j
jC jZ
0'' <j
ij
i j
i
j
 The emigrant chooses remittances level to maximize a separable lifetime utility 
function such as: 
                 { } ( )( ) ( ){ } ( )( )∑ +++++
t
t
vjtjtijtjtj
t
uijtij ZRNRYUVCU σσ 1/1,1/1               (2.2) 
subject to 
                                                                                                             (2.3a) ijtijtijt IRC =+
                 ijtijtijt XI εββ ++= 10                                (2.3b) 
where  is emigrant’s consumption at time t ,  is household income earned by 
receiving household 
ijtC jtY
j  in the native country at time t ,  refers to remittances received 
by the receiving household 
ijtR
j  from migrant  at time ,  identifies the number of i t jtN
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other household emigrants at time t , jtR  quantifies the average remittances per other 
emigrant at time t ,  is the income of the emigrant i  at time ,  describes a vector 
of emigrant’s characteristics at time t , 
ijtI t ijtX
( )( )tuσ+1/1 is a discount rate applied to emigrant 
utility function, and ( )( )tvσ+1/
( )
1 is a discount rate applied to the receiving household 
utility function.  
[ ] ( ) ([ 0=1/1'U j/V1+1 ∂U j+dRtuσ σ
)jtRjtjtijtv YX ,,σ
uZ ++π
u ,σ
Xβ
R
α
Z
), 2σ
+ β
0(


0
α ++ jij ZX π ij if and only Z j+π
 Solving this maximization problem leads to the first order condition for a 
positive level of remittances at time t : 
                 ( ) )]/' +∂− dRU tvij                              (2.4) 
Solving for the level of remittances yields an implicit remittance equation  
                 (ijt NR ,,=∗                                                                  (2.5) 
 In a censored regression model Eq. (2.5) determines both the probability of 
remitting and the level of remittances. I use a linear functional form given by: 
                                                                                                  (2.6) R +=∗
in which X is a vector that includes emigrants’ characteristics, is a vector that consists 
of household characteristics in the recipient country; and u  is a normally distributed 
error term u ~ . The objective of exploring the determinants of remittances lies 
in estimating Eq. (2.6). The domain of the dependent variable is censored since the 
observed remittances are never negative. Remittances are zero for a large number of 
observations.  I rewrite Eq. (2.6) to explicitly illustrate this: 
N
                   =ij
u
R
if
otherwise
uX ijij 0f++ βα


   (2.7) 
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such that i  ;  and  is the total number of migrants in household jk,...1= Jj ,...1= jk j  
and is the total number of receiving households. J
  In a nutshell, to explore the determinants of remittances I need to estimate Eq. 
(2.6). Ordinary least squares (OLS) yield biased estimates because of the nature of the 
dependent variable. Two alternative approaches are usually adopted to estimate Eq. 
(2.6). The first one is a Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. This method requires that 
the decision to remit is a two-step decision: the likelihood of remitting and the level of 
remittances. The second approach is a censored Tobit model. This model assumes that 
the decision to remit is a one-step decision and therefore requires that all determinants 
have the same sign effect on the likelihood and the level of remittances. In this paper the 
second approach is dictated by Eq. (2.5) since it determines both the probability of 
remitting and the level of remittances. 
2.4. Data and Estimation Method 
2.4.1. Data 
The data set is from the 2001 Nicaraguan Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre 
Medición de Niveles de Vida (EMNV). This is a nationally representative survey that 
was administered by the Nicaraguan Institute for Statistics and Census. The national 
living standards measurement survey (LSMS) was established by the World Bank in 
1980. The LSMS collects data on many dimensions of the household well-being 
including consumption, income, employment, education and migration. The data set 
contains 4001 households including 22,810 household members. The survey was 
administered in 2001. Receiving household members were asked about their age, 
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education, property, income, occupation, businesses and any agricultural activities. This 
survey includes a remittances model where a knowledgeable member of the receiving 
household was asked about other household members who do not live in the household. 
All the information about emigrants is extracted from their primary receiving household. 
I have information on their destination, labor force status, age, education, their 
relationship to the head of the main household and also their year of migration. The 
remittances module documents 897 migrants in total. 
 Unlike all previous studies I have information on the sender and the recipient 
from the same source, the original receiving household. One contribution of this paper is 
that I am able to track information on both sides of the remittance behavior from the 
same source. This ability to identify each individual allows me to further understand 
how intra-family decisions are made regarding the allocation of resources across 
households that are separated by the migration of some of its members (Menjívar, 1995).  
Even with this unique data set I can only precisely recognize the decision to 
remit of migrants. I cannot identify the exact amount of remittances sent by each 
migrant.4 This lack of information causes a problem since I cannot identify the exact 
amount remitted by each migrant. To avoid this problem I separate migrants into three 
categories based on their decision to participate in the remitting process. The first 
category includes migrants who do not remit such that their remittances are zero. The 
second category has migrants who remit but also who belong to households with only 
                                                 
4 A knowledgeable member of the receiving household was asked whether migrant i  remits or not. The 
same member was also asked about the monetary value of remittances that the household received in the 
last 12 months. 
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one migrant remitting (  where  is the number of remitting migrants in 
household
1=js js
j ). Again I know the exact amount that these migrants are sending. The third 
category consists of migrants who remit and who belong to multiple remitting migrants’ 
households ( ). In this last category I do not observe the exact amount of 
remittances for each migrant remitting. I average the total amount of remittances 
received by the original household on all the migrants who remit. The following 
subsection explains in details the estimation method. 
1>js
1.4.2. Estimation Method 
I re-write Eq. (2.6) as the following: 
                 ijjijij uZXR +++= πβα                                                                             (2.8) 
I take the average of Eq. (2.8) by summing over migrants who are remitting within each 
receiving household with multiple migrants remitting and then dividing by . This leads 
to Eq. (2.9) which, hereafter, I refer to as the average model: 
js
                 ∑∑∑
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j
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s
R
s
R
s 111
1111 πβα                                  (2.9) 
where  is the total amount of remittances received by household jR j  from all  remitting 
migrants belonging to household j  and is the number of migrants who remit in 
household
js
j . If the number of remitting migrants  is either zero or one then the model 
follows Eq. (2.8). Otherwise the model is defined by Eq. (2.9). Also, since u ~ 
then the new error term 
js
ij
)2,0( σN ∑
=
js
i 1
= ij
j
u
s
1
je  is not homoskedastic with 
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je ~ . Therefore, Eq. (2.9) defines a heteroskedastic Tobit with a known form of 
heteroskdeasticity. In fact: 
),0( 2jN σ
cov(
                 ( ) ( )


 ++++=


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s
Varu
s
Vare K321
1
11Var               (2.10) 
Eq. (2.10) holds for all households and can be rewritten as: 
                 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 22 ))1(1(1;cov11;cov1 jj
j
sjijj
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ijij
j
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s
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s
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where  is a migrant other than migrant i  in household s j , ( ) 2); σ== ijijij uVaruucov( , 
jsjuij u σ=);  and ρ== )(*)
);
);(
sjij
sjij
sjij ustdstd
uu
uucorr
(
cov(
u
. The variance of the new 
error term is a function of the variance of the original model in Eq. (2.8), the number of 
remitting migrants within a household and the correlation of the error terms of different 
remitting migrants who belong to the same receiving household.   
The correlation coefficient ρ  measures the correlation between u and .ij sju 5 A 
positive ρ  suggests that if migrant i remits then migrant s also remits and both 
remittances amounts move in the same direction. This suggests some competition 
between migrants within the same receiving household. A less aggressive hypothesis 
proposes that migrants coming from the same receiving household share the same 
background and behave in a similar manner. If migrant i sees a need to remit then 
migrant  sees the same need and also remits and the latter is conditional on their s
                                                 
5 The following condition 
1
1
−
−>
js
ρ  applies for  to insure a positive variance. 2≥js
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abilities to remit. A negative ρ  implies a negative relationship between the error terms 
of the remitting migrants in the same household. This indirect connection defines a 
crowding out effect. The fact that migrant is remitting discourages other migrants in the 
same receiving household from remitting. This negative relationship might also 
represent an ex-ante agreement on the remitting behavior between all migrants within 
the same receiving household.
i
6 Both of these cases indicate that remitting decisions 
among migrants belonging to the same receiving household are interdependent. Finally, 
if ρ is equal to zero then migrants’ decisions to participate in the remitting process are 
independent.  
=j
)] (γ
( )
X
2 X
−
h+ ρ
The coefficients in Eqs. (2.8) and (2.9) α , β  and π , are the same as the 
coefficients in Eq. (2.6) which insure the same interpretation of the results. I estimate the 
average model using maximum likelihood estimation. The likelihood function 
 for the average model is the following: ∑
=
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6 A positive correlation coefficient can also signal an ex-ante agreement where migrants have agreed on a 
remitting schedule. 
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where Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and ( ). σθσ
βγ 1; == .7 I 
maximize with respect to jL θγ ;  and ρ . In the following subsection I describe the data.  
2.4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.2 presents a comparison of characteristics between emigrants and native 
population. Migrant are twice likely to be in their 20s relative to native population. 
Emigrants tend to be male and more educated and the households they left behind are 
more likely to reside in urban areas.8  
 
Table 2.2 
 Characteristics of Native and Emigrant Population (percentages) 
 Nicaragua 2001 
                Native Emigrants 
Age                 
     Between 21 and 30 15.2 33.8 
   
Region   
      Urban 52.9 71.8 
   
Gender   
      Male 49.4 53.2 
   
Education   
       Less than 4 Years 63.3 47.6 
   
Proportion Remitting - 53.6 
Mean Years Since Migration - 5.9 
Mean Remittances per Month (U.S. dollars) - 40.2 
Total Sample Size 22,810 897 
 
 
                                                 
7 The likelihood function for the third case ( ) is derived from the likelihood function of the second 
case ( ) with 
1>js
1=js
j
j σ
βγ = ; 
j
j σθ
1= ; ( )( ) 5.01 jj hh −+ ρj = σσ  and 
j
j s
1=h . 
8 There is no significant difference in the years of education between different migrants who belong to the 
same receiving household. 
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The average number of years since migration is roughly six years. The proportion 
of migrants remitting is 54% and the mean remittance is around US$ 40 per month.9 The 
average amount of remittances is similar in magnitude to what Funkhouser (1995) found.  
Table 2.3 presents characteristics of emigrants by destination. The main two 
destinations for Nicaraguan migrants are Costa Rica and The United States.  
 
Table 2.3  
Characteristics of Emigrants by Destination (percentages) 
 Nicaragua 2001 
                Developing Developed 
Age                 
     Between 21 and 30 37.6 25.7 
   
Region   
      Urban 64.7 86.8 
   
Gender   
      Male 53.5 52.4 
   
Education   
       Less than 4 Years 60.9 19.4 
   
Proportion Remitting 47.6 68.0 
Mean Years Since Migration 4.8 8.4 
Mean Remittances per Month (U.S. dollars) 29.4 50.4 
Total Sample Size 609 288 
Notes: 1- The destination developing includes the following: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and 
Tunisia. Costa Rica constitutes 86 percent of this sample.  2- The destination developed includes 
Canada, Greece, Sweden and the United States. 
 
 
Costa Rica accounts for 58% share of the Nicaraguan emigrants. The United 
States accounts for 28%. In Table 2.3 I define two main subsets of destinations and 
include all the developing countries under developing and all the developed countries 
                                                 
9 I use 13.44 Nicaraguan Cordobas for one 2001 U.S. dollar as an exchange rate from to the Banco Central 
de Nicaragua.   
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under developed.10 Nicaraguan emigrants’ characteristics in developing countries are 
different from those in developed countries for gender composition. Emigrants in 
developing countries come from different regions, are less educated and tend to be more 
in their 20s compared to those in developed countries. The highest proportion of 
remitting is by emigrants in developed countries with a 68%. The proportion of 
emigrants remitting in developing countries is less than 50%. As expected, the average 
amount remitted per month is higher for migrants living in developed countries. This 
number is also higher than the mean of the total sample. This is hardly surprising 
because in general developed countries offer higher standards of living, higher wages 
and stronger currency denominations than any other developing country. Living in the 
U.S. or Canada for example gives emigrants a stronger remitting power which translates 
into higher levels of remittances.  
I also stress on the significant difference between the mean years since migration. 
One plausible explanation is that countries like the U.S. and Canada signal long term 
migration intentions due to availability of opportunities and more stable economies.11 
In the following I restrict the sample size to emigrants older than 13.12 Table 2.4 
describes the proportion of migrants remitting by relationship to the head of the 
receiving household and by groups of migrants. A large portion of emigrants are the 
offspring of the head of the household. Only about 5.2% of the emigrants are spouses of  
                                                 
10 For a complete list of countries please refer to Table 2.3. 
11 Migrants who belong to the same multiple migrant household seem to share the same destination 
country since 80% of receiving households report all their migrants living in the same country.  
12 I limit the sample of emigrants in the household to those emigrants older than 13 because the minimum 
age for employment in the two most popular destinations for Nicaraguan emigrants is 15 in Costa Rica 
(The Costa Rican Constitution and The Labor Code) and 14 in the United States (Fair Labor Standards 
Act). 
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Table 2.4 
Emigrant Population Aged 14 and up: Proportion Remitting by Relationship to the Head of the 
Receiving Household and by Group (percentages) 
                      Proportion Remitting 
Relationship to the Head of the Receiving Household               
If Spouse of the Head of the Household    5.22 72.09 
    
If Child of the Head of the Household  61.97 62.35 
    
If Parent of the Head of the Household  3.04 60.00 
    
If Child in law of the Head of the Household  4.01 51.52 
    
If Sibling of the of the Household  10.45 46.51 
    
If Grandchild of the Head of the Household  7.65 39.68 
    
If Other Relationship to the Head of the Household  3.89 34.38 
    
If Not Related to the Head of the Household  3.77 58.06 
  100.00  
    
Emigrant Population by Groups    
Working  80.68 63.55 
    
Student  8.87 30.14 
    
Stay at-Home Wife  7.53 46.16 
    
Other  2.93 12.5 
    
    
Sample Size   823 
 
 
the head of the household.  Siblings to the head of the household form approximately 
10% of the total number of emigrants. These groups are ranked by the closeness of the 
relationship between the migrant and the head of the household from closest to farthest. 
This ranking also coincides with the ranking of the fraction of emigrants remitting 
except for the last group, not related, where I note a surprising 58% remitting. I suppose 
either a strong friendship or some investment opportunities behind this high proportion.  
 24
Table 2.4 also separates the emigrant population into four subgroups. 
Approximately 80% of emigrants have a job. Around 64% of the working emigrants 
send money back home. As expected the proportion of students remitting is 30% much 
smaller than those migrants working. 
In Table 2.5 I discuss the characteristics of the receiving households by number 
of remitting emigrants per household.  Out of 495 households that have at least one 
migrant living abroad, 41% have at least one migrant remitting. It seems that there is a 
negative relationship between the number of remitting migrants and the percentage of 
working head of households. Section 2.5 presents the results. 
 
Table 2.5 
Distribution of Receiving Households and Their Characteristics by Number of  Sending                 
Emigrants Aged 14 and up (percentages) 
Number of 
Sending 
Emigrants per 
Household 
Percentage of 
Households 
Mean Years of 
Education of the Head 
of the Household 
Percentage 
Residing in 
Urban Areas 
Percentage 
Working Head 
of Household 
                                
0 36.77 2.67 73.63 74.73 
     
1 41.82 2.91 75.63 61.35 
     
2 14.55 2.98 61.11 55.56 
     
3 4.24 2.19 76.19 47.62 
     
4 or more 2.62 3.15 76.92 46.15 
     
All Households 100.00 2.81 72.73 64.44 
     
Sample Size of Receiving Households  495 
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2.5. Results 
In this section I discuss the set of independent variables that form X and Z  in 
Eq. (2.6). At the remitting decision stage a migrant’s individual characteristics play a 
major role. I include migrants’ age, gender, level of schooling, employment status, 
destination, years living abroad and the relationship to the head of the receiving 
household. Likewise I expect the receiving household’s attributes to have an effect on 
the migrant’s remitting decisions. I include the receiving household area of residence, 
the labor status and the years of education of the head of the household.    
Table 2.6 outline three model specifications with different subset of independent 
variables for the average model presented in Section 2.4. Column (1) shows the 
maximum likelihood estimates of a heteroskedastic Tobit on both emigrant and receiving 
household characteristics. Column (2) includes a set of emigrant’s characteristics while 
column (3) includes the receiving household’s characteristics.13 Migrant’s gender, the 
labor force status, destination and the relationship to the head of the receiving household 
all significantly affect the remitting behavior. The education level and the labor status of 
the head of the household also affect the remitting process.14 
One of the contributions of this paper is quantifying the results. Table 2.7 
decomposes the heteroskedastic Tobit coefficients into two effects: a change in the 
probability of remitting and a percentage change in the amount remitted.  
                                                 
13 A list of definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables is in Appendix A. All the independent 
variables are in discrete form. The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly remittances measured in 
2001 U.S. dollars. 
14 The variables of migrant education and years since migration are defined around their median which is 
four years. The variable of head of household education is defined around four for comparison purpose 
with the migrant education variable (the median is three for this variable). 
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Table 2.6 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates for a Heteroskedastic Tobit Average Model of the Amount Remitted 
by Emigrants Aged 14 and up 
 Amount Remitted 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept  -0.551  -2.18***  1.993*** 
  (0.648)  (0.533)  (0.424) 
Emigrant Characteristics       
1 if Age between 21 and 30  0.387  0.259  - 
  (0.269)  (0.271)   
1 if Male  -0.462*  -0.523**  - 
  (0.265)  (0.268)   
1 if Education less than 4 Years  -0.327  -0.426  - 
  (0.291)  (0.283)   
1 if Years since Migration less than 4  -0.318  -0.279  - 
  (0.255)  (0.258)   
1 if Working  2.200***  2.251***  - 
  (0.357)  (0.364)   
1 if Emigrant Resides in a Dev. Country  1.273***  1.327***  - 
  (0.294)  (0.294)   
1 if Spouse of the Head of the Household  2.032***  2.032***  - 
  (0.515)  (0.539)   
1 if Parent of the Head of the Household  1.549**  1.830***  - 
  (0.654)  (0.688)   
1 if Child of the Head of the Household  0.866***  0.905***  - 
  (0.294)  (0.297)   
Household Characteristics       
1 if Urban Residence  -0.690**  -  -0.305 
  (0.284)    (0.286) 
1 if Education of HHH less than 4  -0.702**  -  -1.103*** 
  (0.282)    (0.286) 
1 if Head of the Household Working  -0.938***  -  -1.129*** 
  (0.239)    (1.129) 
Log Likelihood  -675.07  -686.14  -725.71 
       
Theta = θ   0.361***  0.355***  0.331*** 
  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.009) 
Rho = ρ   0.314*  0.392**  0.392** 
  (0.168)  (0.180)  (0.172) 
Sample  661  661  661 
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Table 2.7 
Summary of The Change in Amount of Remittances and Change in Probability of Remitting Results of 
Model (1) in Table 2.6 
                Average Model 
                Percentage Change in Probability 
Percentage Change in 
Amount 
Variables   
Intercept -7.93 -19.2 
   
Emigrant Characteristics   
1 if Age between 21 and 30 5.57 13.5 
   
1 if Male -6.64 -16.1 
   
1 if Education less than 4 Years -4.71 -11.4 
   
1 if Years since Migration less than 4 -4.58 -11.1 
   
1 if Working 31.6 76.8 
   
1 if Emigrant Resides in a Dev. Country 18.3 44.4 
   
1 if Spouse of the Head of the Household 29.2 70.9 
   
1 if Parent of the Head of the Household 22.2 54.1 
   
1 if Child of the Head of the Household 12.4 30.2 
   
Household Characteristics   
1 if Urban Residence -9.93 -24.1 
   
1 if Education of HHH less than 4 -10.1 -24.5 
   
1 if Head of the Household Working -13.5 -32.7 
 
 
Male migrants are less likely to remit. The probability of remitting decreases by 
around 7% for male migrants. These findings strengthen the belief of gender differences 
in the remitting behavior. Migrants who have a job are 32% more likely to remit than 
those who are not working. Also the percentage change in the level of remittances is a 
large increase of 77% for working migrants. Living in the U.S. or Canada increases both 
the probability (18%) and the percentage change in the amount of remittances (44%). 
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The labor status and the destination of the migrant seem to have a significant role in the 
remitting behavior for Nicaraguans. Together they shape the remitting ability of 
migrants.  
The probability and amount of remittances increase for migrants belonging to the 
nuclear family. The increase in the probability and the amount is the largest for the 
migrants who are the spouse or the parent (29% to 22% for the probability and 71% to 
54% for the change in the amount) compared to migrants who are the child of the head 
of the household (12% to 30%). The difference in these magnitudes is most likely 
explained by the responsibility that spouses and parents share toward the receiving 
household. Spouses and parents share the responsibility of providing for the receiving 
household while this responsibility is not that evident for child migrants. Also the large 
difference of the percent change in the amount between a migrant spouse and a migrant 
parent strengthens this hypothesis since it also illustrates the difference between the roles 
of parents and spouses (Menjívar et al., 1998, page 104).   
From the household characteristics, the likelihood of remitting and the 
percentage change in the amount remitted decrease for migrants belonging to a receiving 
household with a head of household who reports less than four years of education (10% 
and 25% respectively). The same results apply for receiving households with a working 
head (14% and 33% respectively). A working head of the receiving household signals a 
stable source of income and possibly less need for financial help.  
The main contribution of the paper is quantifying the interaction among remitters 
within the same receiving household. Social interactions and decision making are topics 
 29
of huge interests for economists. In fact, the literature on the interaction among members 
of the same household is extensive (see, for example, Becker, 1974; Bergstorm, 1989). 
However, no paper has extended this literature into the theory of migrant remittance 
behavior. I measure the remittance behavior between migrants belonging to the same 
household. The correlation coefficient ρ  is positive for all three regressions. This 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level and is around 
0.39 for two of the three regressions. In order to measure ρ  with more precision I re-
estimate the average model with fewer controls.  
 
Table 2.8 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates for a Heteroskedastic Tobit Average Model of the Amount Remitted 
by Emigrants Aged 14 and up: Fewer Controls 
        A B C D E F 
Variables                         
Intercept -1.673*** -0.204 0.161 0.056 0.297 0.190 
 (0.380) (0.218) (0.202) (0.206) (0.198) (0.200) 
       
1 if Working 2.327***      
 (0.369)      
1 if in Dev. Country  1.483***     
  (0.260)     
1 if Parent of HHH   0.942    
   (0.796)    
1 if Spouse of HHH    1.810***   
    (0.532)   
1 if Sibling of HHH     -1.158**  
     (0.468)  
       
Theta = θ  0.333*** 0.329*** 0.323*** 0.330*** 0.325*** 0.322*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Rho = ρ  0.438*** 0.338** 0.475*** 0.593*** 0.505*** 0.470*** 
 (0.160) (0.162) (0.169) (0.196) (0.175) (0.170) 
Log Likelihood -718.41 -725.80 -740.08 -735.53 -738.97 -740.90 
Sample 661 661 661 661 661 661 
Note: 1- * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. 2- HHH means head of 
the receiving household 3-Dev. Country refers to developed country. 
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Table 2.8 present six different specifications. For instance, column A includes 
the labor status of the migrant while column B represents the average model controlling 
for migrant’s destination.  
The correlation coefficient is significant at the 1 percent significance level for 
five of the six cases and in all these cases the estimates of ρ  are greater than the ones 
presented in Table 2.6. Column F includes no controls and estimates ρ  to be around 
0.47. I refer to this value as the benchmark value.15 
The remitting decision of migrant i  seems to be directly related to the remitting 
decision of migrant  taken into consideration that both migrants belong to the same 
receiving household.
s
16 One can say that migrants within the same receiving households 
compete through remittances. If migrant i remit then migrant  remits and remits more. 
Migrants compete to get the attention of the receiving household.  
s
Another hypothesis proposes that migrants belonging to the same receiving 
household share the same background and therefore behave in the same manner. For 
instance, if migrant i  sees a need to remit then s  sees the same need and also remits. 
Also one can think of an ex-ante agreement hypothesis between migrants. Migrants 
agree on a predetermined schedule of remitting.  
                                                 
15 Note that this model allows me to calculate the homoskedastic variance of the original model. From 
Table ２.8 column F I find that θ  is equal to 0.322 which means that is around 9.64. 2σ
16 Moreover, Tables A.3 to A.4 in Appendix A provide the normal form for a supposed game between 
migrants within the same receiving household. Again evidence suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between the migrants remitting decisions in the same receiving household. Close to 80% of migrants who 
belong to two migrants’ receiving households share the same strategy concerning remitting. For 
households with three and four migrants this number goes down to 46.4% and 55.5% but is still the 
dominant habit.  
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The relationship of the migrant to the head of the receiving household is not 
necessarily the same for all migrants. The difference in the relationship to the head of the 
household can define a different association with the receiving household and therefore a 
different approach towards remitting. I test this suggestion by pooling on all migrants 
who are children of the head of the household. Migrants who are children of the head of 
the household represent the largest group of emigrants.  
 
Table 2.9 
Migrant Remitting Decisions Among Different Samples: Relationship of the Migrant to the Head of the 
Household, Labor Status and Destination 
        
Child Child and Working 
Child and living 
in Costa Rica 
Child and living 
in U.S. or 
Canada 
Variable                         
Intercept 0.445** 0.946*** 0.161 0.829** 
 (0.234) (0.227) (0.301) (0.334) 
     
Theta = θ  0.349*** 0.355*** 0.360*** 0.317*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
Rho = ρ  0.514** 0.254 0.701** 0.459* 
 (0.224) (0.164) (0.355) (0.264) 
Log Likelihood -459.94 -395.62 -291.67 -235.54 
Sample 408 341 269 191 
Note: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. 
 
 
Table 2.9 illustrates four equations with different sub-samples and no controls.17 
The first column includes migrants who are the children of the head of the household. 
The other columns add more restrictions on the children sample by labor status and 
destination. The correlation coefficient estimates do not differ much from the benchmark 
                                                 
17  An attempt was made to classify the relationships between migrants themselves based on the 
relationship to the head of the receiving household. This attempt leads to inaccurate classifications since I 
cannot exactly observe the link between multiple migrants. 
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value except for the migrants who are children and living in Costa Rica.  The estimate of 
ρ  captures the highest correlation (0.70) in the remitting decisions among migrants 
living in Costa Rica and who are siblings. The high correlation estimate might be 
explained by the fact that many Nicaraguans migrate to Costa Rica to work in the coffee 
harvest and share the same remitting behavior. 
2.6. Conclusion 
In recent years remittances have gained international spotlight. Migrant 
remittances can affect the performance of the economy as a whole and can also impact 
the behavior at the household level. One way to develop economic policies that take full 
advantage of these money flows is to understand the remitting behavior.  
  This paper examines the remitting behavior of Nicaraguans. It presents three 
contributions: a unique data set, quantifying the correlation of the remitting decisions 
and calculating the changes in the likelihood and amount of remittances. I use a unique 
data set where I have information on the sender and the receiver from the same source. I 
estimate a heteroskedastic Tobit with a known form of heteroskedasticity to capture both 
the probability of remitting and the levels of remittances. Gender, labor force status and 
destination of the migrant along with the nuclear family all have significant effects on 
the remitting behavior. The labor force status and the education level of the head of the 
receiving household influence the migrant’s decision to participate in the remitting 
behavior.  
 From policy perspective, it seems that foreign migration policies are likely to 
have significant effects on remittances to Nicaragua since these policies are likely to 
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affect the destination of Nicaraguan migrants. Also any economic shocks in the 
destination countries affect the remittance process in Nicaragua by affecting the labor 
status of the Nicaraguan migrant. On the other hand, domestic policies that affect the 
composition of the emigrant pool through gender, receiving household characteristics 
and even the relationship of the migrant to the head of the household are also likely to 
affect the amount of remittances sent back to Nicaragua.  
In addition, migrants belonging to the same receiving household seem to make 
decisions concerning remittances in accordance with other migrants in the same 
household. I find evidence supporting a positive correlation between migrants’ remitting 
decisions. For policy makers this is of great significance. Remittance policies that 
directly target particular migrants are also expected to affect the remittance decisions of 
other migrants belonging to the same receiving household. The full effect of such 
policies can be separated into direct effect through the main policy objective and an 
indirect effect through the significant correlation between the remitting decisions.  
Also, this direct correlation introduces a set of hypotheses on the remitting 
decisions. Migrants within the same receiving household might be competing, behaving 
in the same manner based on their shared background or simply implementing an ex-
ante agreement. It is not very clear from the results in this paper which model of 
household behavior is supported (collective versus unitary) (Browning and Chiappori, 
1998). Also it is not obvious whether the remitting decisions of migrants belonging to 
the same receiving household should be modeled as a cooperative process (ex-ante 
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agreement). More evidence from other data sets is needed in order to investigate this set 
of hypotheses. This approach forms the next step in this line of research.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
WHY REMIT? THE CASE OF NICARAGUA 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades remittances have been on the rise. Official estimates show 
that remittances averaged around 60 billion U.S. dollars per year in the 1990s (World 
Bank) and reached 167 billion U.S. dollars in 2005 (World Bank’s Global Economic 
Prospects).  Several studies document that remittances already exceed foreign aid and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) for some developing countries (Connell and Brown, 
2004; De Haas, 2006; Heilmann, 2006; Chami et al., 2006). This fact raised questions on 
whether remittances can be seen as a possible source of growth (Durand et al., 1996; 
Widgren and Marin, 2002).   
Remittances differ from other types of capital flows in three main aspects. First, 
remittances go directly into the hands of the households in the receiving countries rather 
than indirectly through private or governmental institutions. Second, capital flows such 
as FDIs are in general profit driven and therefore are positively related to GDP growth. 
However, this is not always the case for remittances. Remittances are not always profit 
driven and can be altruistically motivated. Finally, FDIs tend to be less stable relative to 
remittances (Orozco, 2002). 
Uncovering the reasons for remitting is crucial for policy implication for several 
reasons. From the original household perspective, the forces behind remittances can shed 
some light on households’ migration strategies (De La Brière et al., 2002). In fact 
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Hoddinott (1994) stresses that remittances should be incorporated in the model of 
household migration decisions. Hoddinott also notes that remittances can be part of a 
long term contract between the head of the original household and the migrating 
member.  
From a macroeconomic look, remittances are thought to be intended to ease the 
burden of poor economic performance on local recipients (Chami et al., 2005). Therefore 
altruistically motivated remittances are expected to be countercyclical with income 
growth and consequently can decrease the scope of the government intervention in 
recession times. In this particular case, policies built on predictions that remittances 
behave in the same manner as other types of capital flows might have unanticipated 
consequences.  
The literature on remittances has mostly focused on finding the determinants of 
remittances. In this paper I present a simple theoretical model of remittance behavior. I 
consider remittances as unidirectional flows from the migrant in a host country to the 
original household in the home country which I refer to in this paper as the receiving 
household. This allows me to consider the reaction of remittances to a bad state outcome 
on the receiving household. This is the first paper that looks at the response of 
remittances to shocks that pertain to the receiving household. This is crucial in terms of 
investigating the remittance behavior since most remittances consider the migrant as a 
source and the receiving household as the end destination and therefore, they are 
expected to react to any income shocks at the receiving end. This setup gives two broad 
motivations for remitting: altruism where migrants simply care about the receiving 
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household members’ welfare and self-interest where migrants remit for investment 
opportunities that are expected to yield a certain payoff in the future. I test the theoretical 
predictions of this model using survey data from Nicaragua. I quantify the results of the 
heteroskedastic Tobit for policy purposes.  
Altruism seems to be the main motivation behind the remitting behavior to 
Nicaragua. Moreover the remitting behavior is not identical across gender. Female 
migrants seem to behave more altruistically toward the receiving household. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief summary of the 
existing literature. Section 3.3 presents a simple theoretical model of remittance 
behavior. Section 3.4 introduces the data and explains the estimation method. Section 
3.5 includes the results and section 3.6 represents the conclusion. 
3.2. Literature Review 
 
Lucas and Stark (1985) discuss several hypotheses for motivations to remit. 
Three reasons for remitting are presented ranging from pure altruism to pure self-interest 
spanning a more tempered point of view combining these two extremes. Under pure 
altruism a migrant derives utility from the utility of those persons at home. A migrant 
therefore enjoys remitting because this will subsequently increase his utility. Under pure 
self-interest the migrant's satisfaction depends on self-interest goals that range from 
inheritance, investments, and the intention of one day returning home. A third possible 
motive is viewing remittances as part of an arrangement between the migrant and 
persons at home. This arrangement is seen as a mutually beneficial contract between the 
two parties.  
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Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) is one of the first papers that relate the remittance 
behavior and the motivation behind remitting in a theoretical model. Agarwal and 
Horowitz set up a two period model taking into consideration the possibility of multiple 
migrants per household. They solve for the first order conditions of a migrant’s expected 
utility function and define an implicit remittance function for two cases: pure altruism 
and the insurance motive. The key result lies in the significant effect of the number of 
other migrants on remittance under altruism. However the number of migrants does not 
affect average remittance under the risk-sharing case. Agarwal and Horowitz use data for 
Guyana to test their theoretical predictions. Their empirical findings show significant 
differences in the remitting process of migrants from multiple and single migrants’ 
households. Their findings support altruism as a main motivation for remitting.  
Brown and Poirine (2005) make use of the theory of intergenerational transfers to 
sketch a two-period informal, intrafamilial loan arrangement to analyze migrants’ 
remittances of Pacific Island migrants in Sydney, Australia. They develop an alternative 
theory based on parental behavior that lies between strong altruism and self-interest that 
they refer to as “weak altruism”. Their results imply that neither strong altruism nor pure 
self-interest needs to be used to explain intergenerational transfers in low-income 
countries.  They suggest linking the theory of private intergenerational transfers, the 
theory of human capital investment to the theory of migrants’ remittances when 
investigating remittance behavior.   
In a more recent paper Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) stress upon the part of 
remittances transferred to buy two types of insurance: family-provided and self-provided 
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insurance. The authors use data on Mexican immigrants to measure income risk and find 
that increases in the latter raise both the likelihood and the percentage of migrants’ 
earnings remitted for insurance purposes.  
All the papers listed above focus on the risk sharing aspect of remitting by 
investigating the effects of a bad state outcome in the host country on the migrants’ 
remitting behavior. While an income shock in the host country is important in 
determining the remitting ability of the migrant, remittances are consequences of 
migration and they are expected to react to shocks in the receiving country. In the 
following section I present a theoretical model of migrant remitting behavior that allows 
for a bad state shock on the receiving household.  
3.3. Theoretical Model 
 
The goal of this chapter is to derive a hypothesis on the migrant’s remitting 
behavior. In this section I present a variant of the model presented in Agarwal and 
Horowitz (2002).  
The model presented in Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) defines the bad state 
shock to be migrant specific and therefore originates in the destination country of the 
migrant. In this chapter I include a bad state shock on the receiving household and 
investigate the remitting behavior of migrants towards that shock. The main reason 
behind the placement of the bad state shock is that migration and remittances are to a 
certain extent related (Hoddinott, 1994). In this regard, exploring the reaction of 
remittances to an income shock in the receiving household might be crucial for 
determining the remitting behavior. Moreover, in the theoretical model presented in 
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Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) migrants expect monetary transfers from the receiving 
household in case of a bad state outcome in the host country. The authors model the flow 
of remittances as a two way stream. In this paper I model remittances as unidirectional 
monetary flows with the origin being the migrants and the final destination being the 
receiving households. 
In effect, the Nicaraguan dataset analyzed in this chapter includes 505 families 
that have migrants living abroad of which only 16 families send monetary transfers to 
these migrants. Out of these 16 families, six families also receive remittances from 
migrants. This last number of families is around 1.1% of the number of the families that 
have migrants living abroad in the Nicaraguan 2001 survey sample. Table 3.1 presents 
the characteristics of households and migrants by the level of monetary engagement of 
the receiving households in the remitting process conditional on having one migrant 
living abroad. Comparing households that receive remittances in column (B) to 
households that send remittances in column (C), the main difference is in the location of 
residence. Households that send remittances tend to reside in urban areas. In addition, 
differences include the gender composition and labor force status of the head of the 
household, the destination of the migrant, and the relationship of this migrant to the head 
of the receiving household. Male and working head of households tend to form the bulk 
of the receiving households that send remittances abroad. Moreover, it seems that a 
migrant’s move to a developed country requires households in Nicaragua to share the 
cost of the move. In fact, receiving households that send remittances represented in 
columns (C) and (D) show larger percentages of migrants living in developed countries 
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relative to those households that receive remittances and those that do not send or 
receive. For those households with dual remittances flows, column (D), the striking 
difference is the location of the residence and the destination of the migrant.  
 
Table 3.1 
Characteristics of Receiving Households and Migrants by Remitting Process 
 Households 
that Do Not 
Receive Nor 
Send 
Remittances 
(A) 
Households 
that Receive 
Remittances 
 
 
(B) 
Households 
that Send 
Remittances 
 
 
(C) 
Households 
that Send and 
Receive 
Remittances 
 
(D) 
Receiving Households     
Percent Residing in Urban Areas 73.3 71.8 81.2 100.0 
Percentage Head of Household Male 58.3 49.1 60.0 66.6 
Percent Head of Household Working 75.0 57.6 86.6 100.0 
Mean Age Head of Household 51.6 54.5 50.6 48.5 
Mean Years of Education of Head of 
Household 3.2 2.8 2.8 3.3 
     
Sample 180 309 16 6 
     
Migrants     
Mean Migrant Age 28.0 30.3 29.5 33.1 
Mean Migrant Education 6.9 4.5 4.5 4.8 
Mean Years of Migration 5.7 6.7 7.4 9.0 
Percent Residing in Developed 
Countries 20.0 36.3 48.6 66.6 
Percent Working 62.3 78.5 75.6 94.4 
Percent Male 54.2 52.8 51.3 50.0 
     
Sample 260 600 37 18 
Note: 1- All the households in this table have at least one migrant living abroad. 2- Developed 
Countries include Canada, Greece, Sweden and United States.  
 
 
To summarize, the receiving households that participate in sending remittances 
have on average notably higher percentages of working head of households, male head 
of households and younger head of households. Now focusing on only columns (A) and 
(B) I note that there might be a threshold level of households’ characteristics that define 
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receiving households which do not send or receive versus those that do send monetary 
transfers to migrants living abroad. The percentages of working head of the household, 
residing in urban areas and male head of household are indeed higher under column (A) 
than those in column (B) but still lower than the percentages in column (C). Also the 
migrants who belong to households in column (C) tend to be living in developed 
countries.18 
Additionally, the small number of families who engage in two direction 
remittances seem to be consistent across low income countries. Agarwal and Horowitz 
(2002) report a very similar finding for Guyana (1.4%). For the purpose of this chapter I 
ignore remittances from receiving households because it seems that across developing 
countries the frequency of two-way remittances is relatively small. In the following 
subsection I present the theoretical model.  
3.3.1. Pure Altruism 
Based on the previous section, I assume that migrants do not receive monetary 
transfers from their original household. This assumption leaves out the specific case of 
risk-sharing that the literature has extensively modeled but it does follow the empirical 
evidence more closely (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 
2006). I build a two period model where a migrant who cares about the welfare of the 
receiving household has the following utility: 
                 U Hiii CCC logloglog 21 δβα ++=                                                           (3.1) 
                                                 
18 The subset of developed countries as a destination for Nicaraguan migrants includes Canada, Greece, 
Sweden and United States. The countries that did not make it in this sample are Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, 
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama 
and Tunisia. Both samples cover the destination of all the migrants in the Nicaraguan 2001 survey sample.  
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where α is the weight on migrant i ’s consumption in period 1 given by C , 1i β  is the 
weight on migrant i ’s consumption in period 2 given by C  and 2i δ is the weight on C , 
the recipient household consumption. The weights on consumption are positive such as 
H
α<0  and β<0 and δ≤0 . The receiving household consumption depends on high 
income Y  with probability of H π  and low income Y  with probability of L π−1 , with 
 The receiving household consumption also depends on the total remittances 
received by the household
.0>L−H YY
R . The total remittances R  can be written as r  where 
 is migrant ’s own remittances and, k is the number of other migrants belonging to 
the same receiving household who remit on average r . The altruistic migrant chooses r  
to maximize utility subject to:  
i−i + kr
ir i
i− i
                                                                                    (3.2) iii rYC −= 11
                                         (3.3) 22 ii YC =
and 
                 ( ) iiLHH krrYYC −++−+= ππ 1                                                                   (3.4) 
where Y is the migrant’s income in the first period and r  is the migrant’s remittances. 
The second period migrant’s consumption C depends on the migrant’s second period 
incomeY . The migrant chooses the level of remittances to maximize utility subject to 
(3.2), (3.3) and (3.4). The first order conditions (FOC) are: 
1i
2i
i
2i
                 ( ) 011 =++−++−
−=∂
∂
−iiLHii krrYYrYr
U
ππ
δα                                           (3.5)                            
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Solving for r  from Eq. (3.5) I define a remittance function given by: i
                 ( )π;;;;1* kYYYrr LHii =                                                                                  (3.6) 
Eq. (3.6) states that remittances sent by migrant i  depends on the migrant’s first 
period income, the receiving household income, the number of other migrants belonging 
to the same receiving household, and the probability of a good state in the receiving 
country. Using the implicit function theorem, I derive two hypotheses on migrants’ 
remitting behavior19: 
                 022
1
2
<−−
−−=∂
∂
−−
−
−
Hi
iH
CC
rC
k
r
δα
δ
                                                                           (3.7) 
                 
( )
022
1
2
<−−
−−−=∂
∂
−−
−
Hi
LHH
CC
YYCr
δα
δ
π                                                                         (3.8) 
Both derivations represented in Eqs. (3.7) and (3.8) have a negative sign. This 
suggests that altruistic migrants’ remittances respond negatively to both the number of 
other migrants belonging to the same receiving household and the probability of a good 
state in their original country. As the number of migrants from the same household 
increases, the amount of remittances sent by migrant i decreases. Also, as the likelihood 
of a good state increases it is more likely for an altruistic migrant to decrease remittances 
sent home. This is consistent with the belief that remittances are often thought to be 
intended to mitigate the burden of poor economic performance on the receiving 
household.  
                                                 
19 The derivations are in Appendix B.  
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These two hypotheses follow from the altruistic migrant’s utility function where 
the consumption of the receiving household directly enters the migrant utility. For self-
interest motivated remitters the utility of the receiving household does not enter the 
migrant’s utility function as explained in more detail in the next subsection.  
3.3.2. Self-Interest 
In the following I consider the opposite case of pure altruism. For a pure self-
interest migrant the receiving household’s welfare does not enter the utility function and 
this is given by 0=δ . Therefore the utility function of a self-interest motivated remitter 
is: 
                 U 21 loglog iii CC βα +=                                                                             (3.9) 
This migrant maximizes utility subject to:  
                                                 (3.10) iii rYC −= 11
and  
                                                   (3.11) ( )iii rgYC += 22
where for each dollar remitted migrants receive a return on their investment  where 
 and . Migrant  again chooses  to maximize the following utility: 
( )1g
( ) 0' >irg ( ) 0'' >irg i ir
                 ( ) ( )( )iiiii rgYrYU ++−= 21 loglog βα                                                      (3.12) 
subject to constraints (3.9) and (3.10). The FOC is the following: 
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From Eq. (3.13) and the implicit function theorem it is clear that 0=∂
∂
k
r , and 
0=∂
∂
π
r  which suggests that the number of other migrants in the receiving household and 
the likelihood of a good state have no effect on the amount remitted by a self-interest 
motivated migrant. These findings follow from the self-interest migrant utility function 
which does not account for the welfare of any member of the receiving household. 
Both cases of remittance behavior discussed above give distinct theoretical 
predictions that can be empirically tested. In the next section I describe the data and the 
estimation method.  
3.4. Data and Estimation Method  
 
3.4.1. Data 
The data set is a national living standards measurement survey (LSMS) 
administrated in 2001 in Nicaragua. The LSMS was established by the World Bank. This 
nationally representative survey includes data on several aspects of the household and 
includes 4191 families in 4001 households 20 . The survey comprises a remittances 
module where a knowledgeable member of the receiving household in Nicaragua was 
asked about other household members living abroad.  The remittances module includes a 
total of 897 migrants who belong to 505 families residing in Nicaragua. I have 
information on the migrants’ destination, labor force status, age, gender, education, and 
years of migration. I also have information on the receiving household. I know the 
number of migrants who belong to the same household, the labor force status, gender, 
                                                 
20 In some cases more than one family live in one household. For the migrants sample the number of 
families is the same as the number of households.  
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age and education of the head of the receiving household, as well as the residence of the 
receiving household.  
3.4.2. Estimation Method 
In order to investigate the migrant’s remitting behavior I need to determine the 
signs of two relationships: remittances r  and the number of other migrants k  and also 
remittances r  and the likelihood of a good state
i
i π  or a bad state π−1 .  
The dependent variable  is never negative. The level of remittances is zero for a 
large number of observations which means that the data on remittances are truncated 
since remittances are unobserved for the migrants that do not participate in the remitting 
process. In a censored regression model, Eq. (3.6) determines both the probability of 
remitting and the level of remittances. I consider a remittance Eq. which has remittances 
by Nicaraguan migrants as a function of individual and household characteristics: 
ir
                 iii uZXr +++= 210 βββ                                                                           (3.14) 
 
where includes migrants’ individual characteristics, iX Z  refers to the household 
characteristics and ( )2,0~ σNiu .  The migrants and households characteristics enter the 
remittances implicit function in Eq. (3.6) through the migrants’ and the receiving 
households’ income levels. In the Nicaraguan survey data, I do not observe migrants’ 
income. However I know the migrants’ characteristics (age, gender, education, 
destination, years living abroad and labor force status) and I use those as a proxy for 
income. In Eq. (3.6) the migrant’s first period income Y  is therefore a function of 
migrants’ characteristics given X  by
1i
i ( )XiY . For the receiving household I do observe 
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the income but for endogeneity reasons I follow the same approach and use the receiving 
heads of households’ characteristics Z  to proxy for their income level.  
iju
Ordinary least squares (OLS) give biased estimates because of the nature of the 
dependent variable. The Tobit model uses the same set of covariates to model both the 
decision to remit and the amount of remittances. However the coefficients on the 
likelihood of remitting and the amount remitted from a Tobit have the same sign. 
Following Wooldridge (2003), comparing the results of a standard probit to the Tobit 
can be an assessment of the suitability of the Tobit model.  For comparison reasons I 
show the results of a standard Probit and compare the signs of the statistically significant 
coefficients with the signs of the significant coefficients from the Tobit equation.  
The Nicaraguan survey data identifies migrants who are remitters but does not 
identify the exact amount remitted by those migrants. I know the total supply of 
remittances received by a particular receiving household, the number of migrants living 
abroad and which of these migrants are remitters and which are not. It seems that this 
type of data problem is not uncommon. In fact the same problem exists in the Guyanese 
data explored by Agarwal and Horowitz (2002). To overcome this data limitation I 
proceed with two different approaches. The first approach is to define what I will refer to 
hereafter as the average model. I re-write Eq. (3.14) as follows: 
                 jijij ZXr +++= 210 βββ                                                                       (3.15) 
where i  refers to a specific migrant belonging to the receiving household j . I take the 
average of Eq. (3.15) by summing over remitters in household j  and dividing by the 
number of remitters . This leads to the following equation: js
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where  is the total supply of remittances to household j . If the number of remitting 
migrants  is either zero or one then the model follows Eq. (3.15). Otherwise the model 
is defined by Eq. (3.16). Note that the coefficients in Eqs. (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16) are 
the same which insures the same interpretation of the results. Note that since u ~ 
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Eq. (3.17) can be rewritten as: 
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where  is a migrant other than migrant i  in household s j , ( ) 2); σ== ijijij uVaruucov( , 
jsjuij u σ=)cov( ;  and ρ== )(*)
);
);(
sjij
sjij
sjij ustdstd
uu
uucorr
(
cov(
u
. The variance of the new 
error term is a function of the variance of the original model in Eq. (3.8), the number of 
remitting migrants within the receiving household and the correlation of the error terms 
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of different remitting migrants who belong to the same receiving household.21 Finally I 
estimate the average model using maximum likelihood estimation.22 
The second approach is to limit the sample to those migrants belonging to 
households with at most one remitting migrant. For each of those migrants I can exactly 
identify the amount remitted. I count 387 households in that category which constitutes 
around 78% of the 494 receiving households. The new migrant sample is 555 which 
represent around 62% of the original 897 migrants. However, there is some concern 
regarding selectivity bias. Households with at most one remitting migrant probably share 
unobserved characteristics that make them form a non random sample. The selection 
issue comes into play in forming the limited sample: households with at most one 
remitting migrant. In order to overcome this issue I follow Heckman (1979). The next 
section discusses the selection bias problem in more details. In addition, section 5 
elaborates more on the data and presents the results of these two approaches.   
3.5. Results 
 
To explore the remittance behavior of Nicaraguan migrants I need to investigate 
the relationship between r  and , and between  andi k ir π . However before going into the 
results I examine the data in more detail. Table 3.2 examines the characteristics of the 
receiving households by number of other migrants. Table 3.2 searches for any possible 
relationship between the number of other migrants and receiving household 
                                                 
21 This condition 
1
1
−
−>
js
ρ is necessary when s  to guarantee a positive variance. 2≥j
22 More details on the likelihood function of the average model are presented in Appendix B. 
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characteristics that might play a role in the sign of the coefficient on . There is no clear 
pattern that can be inferred from Table 3.2.  
k
  
Table 3.2 
Characteristics of Receiving Households by Number of Other Migrants  k
 
 
k  
Percentage 
Residing in 
Urban Areas 
Percentage 
Working 
Head of 
Household 
Percentage 
Head of 
Household 
Male 
Mean Age 
Head of 
Household 
Mean Years 
Education 
Head of 
Household Sample 
0 75.3 68.3 49.6 52.7 2.9 300 
1 64.7 62.8 58.1 52.4 2.7 105 
2 63.4 56.1 58.5 57.8 2.4 41 
3 90.9 59.0 59.0 56.8 2.9 22 
≥ 4 69.2 46.1 50.0 54.9 2.2 26 
All 72.4 64.5 52.6 53.4 2.8 494 
 
 
The percentage of head of household working seems to be decreasing with the 
number of other migrants but with three other migrants in the household this number 
picks up again and then with more than four other migrants it decreases again. Note that 
the larger the number of other migrants is, the smaller the sample of households is. The 
other household characteristics do not show any specific pattern.  
 In order to capture the probability of a good state versus the probability of a bad 
state I define two different measures. The first proxy is a dummy variable that is one if 
the head of the receiving household left the last job for a particular set of reasons. In 
total, fifteen different answers are listed. The question in the Nicaragua survey is not 
very clear about when the head of the receiving household left their last job. Table 3.3 
lists the reasons and the distribution of households by reason.  The list does not follow 
any particular order and the reasons are listed as they appear in the survey. The reasons 
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that the heads of household mention include liquidation of the enterprise, being fired, 
retirement plans, end of contract, seasonal work, lack of work, personal duties, school 
duties, lack of safety at work, harassment in the work place and illness. I presume that 
leaving for all of the reasons in Table 3.3 except for the following reasons: retirement 
plan, end of contract and studies (reasons numbered 3, 5 and 12 in Table 3.3) is a 
measure of bad outcome. I exclude these latter reasons from the construction of the bad 
outcome measure because they define reasons that could have been expected and 
therefore the receiving household could have acted upon ahead of time.  
 
Table 3.3 
Distribution of Households by Reason of Head of the Household Leaving the Last Job 
Reasons Percentage Count 
1- The enterprise was liquidated 1.8 9 
2- You were dismissed 0.6 3 
3- Retirement Plan 0.2 1 
4- By age 3.6 18 
5- End of the contract 1.6 8 
6- Agricultural cycle/seasonal work ended 0.2 1 
7- You are pensioned off 2.4 12 
8- You earned not much money 2.0 10 
9- You did not like your job 0.6 3 
10- Not much work 0.0 0 
11- Family/home duties 4.6 23 
12- Studies 0.0 0 
13- Insufficient industrial safety 0.4 2 
14- Improper treatment or psychological pressures 6.6 33 
15- Illness 1.0 5 
   
Sample 25.6 128 
 
 
 A second measure of the likelihood of a bad state is the length of time that the 
head of household has been without work. Out of 494 heads of household 128 have been 
looking for a job for at least one day. From Table 3.4, 101 heads of household out of 128 
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have been looking for a job for at least one year. I construct a dummy variable for those 
households that have been looking for a job for more than one year. I chose the longest 
search time (the other choices are days, weeks and months) since a long period of time 
better tests the remitting behavior of migrants. It also signals a worse financial situation 
for the households relative to the other search periods. 
 
Table 3.4 
Distribution of Households by Length of Job Search 
Time Spent looking for a Job  Percentage Count 
Days 0.7 1 
Weeks 0.7 1 
Months 19.5 25 
Years 78.9 101 
   
Sample 25.6 128 
 
 
 Note that both proxies define two different income levels for the receiving 
household. If the head of the household is unemployed or has been looking for a job for 
more than a year, then, in either case, the total income level of the receiving household 
must be different from the total household income in the opposite situation.   
 Table 3.5 presents the characteristics of households by measure of bad state and 
the characteristics of those households not affected by a bad state shock. For both 
measures the majorities of households are located in urban areas and have a female head 
of household.  The mean age of the head of the household is around 60 years old. Those 
households not affected reside in relatively more rural areas than those affected and also 
have a majority of male head of households.   
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Table 3.5 
Characteristics of Receiving Households by Measures of Bad State versus Unaffected Households 
 
Measure of 
Bad State 
 
 
Percentage 
Residing in 
Urban Areas 
Percentage Head of 
Household Male 
Mean Age Head of 
Household 
Mean Years of 
Education Head of 
Household 
Left Last Job 
(Sample: 128) 82.8 38.2 60.1 2.6 
     
More than 1 
Year looking 
for a Job 
(Sample: 101) 
84.1 31.6 61.8 2.5 
     
Not Affected 
(Sample: 366) 68.8 57.6 51.0 2.8 
  
 
Table 3.6 shows the characteristics of the pool of migrants who originated from 
non-affected head of households, from head of households who left their job for one of 
the 15 reasons in Table 3.3 and those head of households who have been looking for a 
job for at least one year. Table 3.6 investigates any differences in migrants’ 
characteristics that determine migrants’ incomeY . The only striking difference is the 
gender composition of the migrants’ population. More than 50% of the migrant 
population from unaffected households is male whereas more than 50% of migrants 
from affected households are females.  
i
From the theoretical model in Section 3.3 the characteristics of the head of the 
receiving household and of the migrants determine their respective income levels. Eq. 
(3.14) includes migrants and household characteristics. Migrant’s individual 
characteristics play a major role in the remitting decision. I control for age, level of 
schooling, gender, destination, years since migration and employment status of the 
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migrant. These characteristics affect the migrant’s ability to remit. Moreover, I control 
for the head of the household education level, age, gender, the receiving household area 
of residence and the number of household nonmigrating members. The main two 
covariates in the theoretical model, the number of other migrants and the measure of bad 
state are also considered household characteristics.  
 
Table 3.6 
Migrants’ Characteristics by Measures of Bad State versus Unaffected Households  
Characteristics 
Head of Household 
Not Affected 
 
 
Head of Household 
Left Last Job 
 
Head of Household 
More than 1 Year 
looking for a Job 
Male 56.3 44.58 44.1 
Working 74.6 73.9 76.9 
Residing in a Developed Country 30.9 33.7 35.3 
Mean Age 28.9 30.1 31.3 
Mean Education 3.6 3.9 3.9 
Sample 623 249 195 
Note: 1- Male, Working and Residing in a Developed Country are percentages. 2- Developed Country 
destination includes the United States, Canada, Greece and Sweden.  
 
 
Before going into the results I investigate the selection bias problem in more 
details. Table 3.7 compares the households and migrants’ characteristics across two 
different samples: the limited sample, which includes migrants who belong to 
households with at most one remitting migrant, and the total migrant sample. All 
characteristics between these two samples seem to match suggesting that the limited 
sample is a reliable representation of the total migrant population. The only significant 
discrepancy is the percentage of migrants living in developed countries. For the limited 
sample, the percentage of migrant living in developed countries is 25% while for the  
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Table 3.7 
Characteristics of Receiving Households and Migrants for Households with at most One Remitting 
Migrant (Limited Sample) versus Full Migrant Sample 
  
Households with at Most One 
Remitting Migrant 
 
Full Migrant Sample 
 
Receiving Households   
Percent Residing in Urban Areas 0.74 0.72 
Percentage Head of Household Male 0.51 0.52 
Percent Head of Household Working 0.67 0.64 
Mean Age Head of Household 52.8 53.4 
Mean Years of Education of Head of 
Household 2.8 2.6 
   
Sample 387 494 
   
Migrants   
Mean Migrant Age 28.5 29.3 
Mean Migrant Education 3.4 3.7 
Mean Years of Migration 5.7 6.0 
Percent Residing in Developed 
Countries 0.25 0.31 
Percent Working 0.70 0.74 
Percent Male 0.52 0.53 
   
Sample 555 872 
Note: 1- All the households in this table have at least one migrant living abroad. 2- Developed 
Countries include Canada, Greece, Sweden and United States.  
 
 
total sample it is around 31%. However, since unobservable factors can affect the 
membership to the limited sample I investigate what variables can help determine the 
association with this sample.  
Table 3.8 compares the relationship of the migrant to the head of the receiving 
household for three samples: limited sample, the remaining migrants not belonging to 
the limited sample and total migrant sample. The first column in Table 3.8 is notably 
different from both columns (2) and (3). It seems that migrants forming the limited 
sample are more likely to be spouses and parents to the head of the receiving household 
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than the migrants belonging to the other two samples. The migrants forming the limited 
sample are less likely to be the child of the head of the receiving household relative to 
the other two migrant samples.  
 
Table 3.8 
Relationship of the Migrant to the Head of the Receiving Household for Households with at most One 
Remitting Migrant, Full Migrant Sample and the Remaining Sample 
 Limited Sample 
Not in Limited 
Sample Full Sample 
Relationship of the Migrant to 
the Head of the Receiving 
Household 
   
Percentage if Spouse 5.9 2.5 4.7 
Percentage if Parent 3.4 1.8 2.8 
Percentage if Child 55.6 65.2 59.1 
    
Sample 555 317 872 
Note: 1- All the households in this table have at least one migrant living abroad. 2- Developed 
Countries include Canada, Greece, Sweden and United States.  
 
 
I proceed with spouse and parent as the variables defining membership to the 
limited sample to correct for selection bias. I do that partly because of the differences of 
the percentages in Table 3.8 and partly because I expect that in the case of being the 
spouse or the parent of the head of the receiving household chances are that there would 
be at most one remitting migrant. I also include in the selection equation the labor status, 
education level, age, gender, destination, years since migration of the migrant and the 
residence location, education level, age and gender of the head of the receiving 
household because these characteristics have an effect the ability to remit.23  
 
                                                 
23 The results of the selection equation (first stage Probit) are in Table B.3 in Appendix B.  
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Table 3.9 
Probit Estimates for Eq. (3.14): All Migrants 
                    Amount Remitted 
Variables (1)  (2) 
Intercept -0.5137**  -0.4993** 
 (0.2199)  (0.2188) 
Number of other Migrants =  k -0.0443*  -0.0434* 
 (0.0248)  (0.0247) 
Bad State Measure = π−1  0.1726  0.1041 
 (0.1120)  (0.1194) 
1 if Working 1.0687***  1.0648*** 
 (0.1149)  (0.1151) 
1 if Education less than 4 Years -0.206**  -0.2062** 
 (0.1022)  (0.1020) 
1 if Male -0.1807*  -0.1834* 
 (0.0953)  (0.0954) 
1 if Age greater than 29 0.2805***  0.2805*** 
 (0.1085)  (0.0954) 
1 if Destination is Developed Country 0.4598***  0.4572*** 
 (0.1160)  (0.1157) 
1 if Years since Migration greater than 5 -0.0456  -0.0469 
 (0.1108)  (0.1106) 
1 if Urban Residence -0.2863**  -0.2806** 
 (0.1123)  (0.1122) 
1 if Education of HHH less than 4 -0.3084**  -0.3011** 
 (0.1216)  (0.1212) 
1 if HHH Male -0.0221  -0.03164 
 (0.0957)  (0.0954) 
1 if HHH age is greater than 64 0.0696  0.0910 
 (0.1060)  (0.1067) 
Number of Nonmigrants 0.0436**  0.0434** 
 (0.0172)  (0.0171) 
Log Likelihood -506.38  -507.17 
Sample  872  872 
Note: 1- Columns refer to two different measures for the good state probability: column (1) refers to a 
dummy variable for households where the head had lost the last job for one of the reasons discussed in 
Table 3.3. Column (2) refers to a dummy variable for those head of households who have been looking 
for a job for at least one year. 2- HHH refers to head of the receiving household. 3-* denotes 
significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. 
 
 
 
Table 3.9 presents the results of a standard Probit on Eq. (3.14). As mentioned in 
Section 3.4, I can exactly identify the remitters from the non-remitters and this fact will 
identify the dependent variable in the Probit equation. I compare the signs of the 
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statistically significant coefficients in the Probit equation to the signs of the coefficients 
in the main results presented in Tables 3.10a and 3.10b. All the statistically significant 
coefficients from the Probit equation and from Tables 3.10a and 3.10b have the same 
signs. I turn now to the main results.  
Table 3.10a presents the results of two proxies of good state following the 
average model explained in section 3.4. Table 3.10b limits the sample to those receiving 
households with at most one remitting migrant. In Tables 3.10a and 3.10b column (1) 
refers to a dummy variable for households where the head had lost the last job for one of 
the reasons discussed above and column (2) refers to a dummy variable for those head of 
households who have been looking for a job for at least one year. I control for the budget 
constraint of the migrant by including age, gender, level of education, labor force status 
and destination of migrants which implicitly determine migrants’ income. I also control 
for household characteristics as the level of education, the age and gender of the head of 
the receiving household and the location of the household.  
In the average model the variables of interest in this chapter have the sign of the 
altruistic migrant model. However the coefficient on k  is also significant at the 1% 
significance level. Nicaraguan migrants decrease the amount remitted with the increase 
of migration in the original household that they belong to. The coefficients on π−1  
match the theoretical predictions of the altruistic model but are not statistically 
significant under both proxies. Having a job, being a female and living in a developed 
country increase remittances. Being older than 30 seems to positively affect the remitting 
decision. The location of the residence of the receiving household also matters.  
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Table 3.10a 
Tobit Estimates for Eq. (3.14) following the Average Model: All Migrants  
                    Amount Remitted 
Variables (1)  (2) 
Intercept -0.9169*  -0.8821 
 (0.5610)  (0.5586) 
Number of other Migrants =  k -0.8700***  -0.8713*** 
 (0.1071)  (0.1078) 
Bad State Measure = π−1  0.3896  0.3695 
 (0.2887)  (0.3143) 
1 if Working 2.5565***  2.5498*** 
 (0.3339)  (0.3344) 
1 if Education less than 4 Years -0.2452  -0.2519 
 (0.2706)  (0.2699) 
1 if Male -0.8370***  -0.8404*** 
 (0.2448)  (0.2497) 
1 if Age greater than 29 0.8398***  0.8379*** 
 (0.2778)  (0.2780) 
1 if Destination is Developed Country 1.1550***  1.1574*** 
 (0.2871)  (0.2876) 
1 if Years since Migration greater than 5 -0.1876  -0.1898 
 (0.2703)  (0.2702) 
1 if Urban Residence -0.4500*  -0.4528* 
 (0.2801)  (0.2806) 
1 if Education of HHH less than 4 -0.2080  -0.1915 
 (0.2687)  (0.2673) 
1 if HHH Male -0.3634  -0.3650 
 (0.2376)  (0.2399) 
1 if HHH age is greater than 64 -0.1087  -0.1030 
 (0.2939)  (0.2960) 
Number of Nonmigrants 0.0508  0.0482 
 (0.0407)  (0.0407) 
Log Likelihood -641.29  -641.49 
Theta = θ  0.3899***  0.3898*** 
 (0.0151)  (0.0151) 
Rho = ρ  0.6398***  0.6373*** 
 (0.2109)  (0.2116) 
Sample  708  708 
Note: 1- Columns refer to two different measures for the good state probability: column (1) refers to a 
dummy variable for households where the head had lost the last job for one of the reasons discussed in 
Table 3.3. Column (2) refers to a dummy variable for those head of households who have been looking 
for a job for at least one year. 2-* denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. 3- 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 3.10b presents the results of a sample selection corrected estimation on Eq. 
(3.14) limiting the sample to migrants belonging to receiving households with at most 
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one remitting migrant. Similar results to the average model are found in this sample of 
555 migrants.  
 
Table 3.10b  
Sample Selection Estimates for Eq. (3.14): Households with at Most One Remitting Migrant 
                    Amount Remitted 
Variables (1)  (2) 
Intercept 1.1499***  1.1617*** 
 (0.3101)  (0.3109) 
Number of other Migrants =  k -0.2568***  -0.2540*** 
 (0.0378)  (0.0388) 
Bad State Measure = π−1  0.2153  0.1435 
 (0.1721)  (0.1912) 
1 if Working 0.7901***  0.7926*** 
 (0.1419)  (0.1415) 
1 if Education less than 4 Years -0.1472  -0.1446 
 (0.1484)  (0.1485) 
1 if Male -0.2828**  -0.2866** 
 (0.1241)  (-0.1246) 
1 if Age greater than 29 0.3843**  0.3808** 
 (0.1533)  (0.1537) 
1 if Destination is Developed Country 0.6309***  0.6273*** 
 (0.1849)  (0.1858) 
1 if Years since Migration greater than 5 -0.0510  -0.0522 
 (0.1522)  (0.1526) 
1 if Urban Residence -0.0918  -0.0776 
 (0.1617)  (0.1605) 
1 if Education of HHH less than 4 -0.1198  -0.1009 
 (0.1866)  (0.1868) 
1 if HHH Male -0.2720**  -0.2898** 
 (0.1345)  (0.1347) 
1 if HHH age is greater than 64 0.1323  0.1458 
 (0.1784)  (0.1861) 
Number of Nonmigrants 0.0173  0.0154 
 (0.0244)  (0.0243) 
Log Likelihood -1516.47  -1517.04 
    
Sigma = σ  1.4529  1.4544 
Lambda = λ  -0.4866***  -0.4871*** 
    
Sample  555  555 
Note: 1- Columns refer to two different measures for the good state probability: column (1) refers to a 
dummy variable for households where the head had lost the last job for one of the reasons discussed in 
Table 3.3. Column (2) refers to a dummy variable for those head of households who have been looking 
for a job for at least one year. 2-* denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. 3- 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 62
The signs on k   and π−1  match the theoretical predictions of the altruistic migrant. 
Again, only the coefficient on k  is statistically significant. The other covariates also 
follow the same pattern as the variables in the average model except now the gender of 
the head of the household significantly affects remittances.  
To summarize, there is some empirical evidence that points to some extent to the 
theoretical predictions of the altruistic migrant model developed in Section 3.3. 
Controlling for the migrants’ budget constraint and some head of household 
characteristics, migrants remit less when the number of other migrants increase and they 
also remit more in case of negative income shock in the receiving household. However, 
Nicaraguan migrants seem to react more to the number of migrants in their original 
household in Nicaragua. In both approaches the coefficient on k  is negative and 
significant. The coefficient on π−1  is positive in all these cases but again not 
statistically significant. The labor status, destination and gender of the migrant affect the 
remitting decision and seem to be robust across all three approaches. The receiving 
household income level also seems to affect the remitting decision since the household 
income level is determined by the education of the head of the household, the gender of 
the head of the household and the location of the residence. All these characteristics 
affect the remitting decision.  
Note that the average model computes the correlation coefficient between the 
error terms of the remitting migrants belonging to the same receiving households. The 
correlation coefficient ρ  is positive, statistically significant and close to 0.63 in value. 
This positive value suggests that the remitting decision of migrants belonging to the 
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same receiving household is positively correlated. Also, from Table 10b I calculate the 
sample selection parameter λ to be around -0.48 and statistically significant suggesting 
that a sample selection bias does exist in building the limited sample.  
For policy purposes, Table 3.11 separates the Tobit coefficients of both variables 
of interests from the average approach into two effects: a change in the probability of a 
remitting and a percentage change in the amount remitted. One additional migrant 
decreases the probability of remittances by no more than 13%. Migrants are 6% more 
likely to remit in case of a bad state shock. For the amount percentage changes, migrants 
remit 28% less with one additional migrant and they remit between 13% more in 
response to a bad income shock.  
 
Table 3.11 
Summary of The Change in Amount of Remittances and Change in Probability of Remitting Results 
for column (1) in Table 3.10a  
 Percentage Change in 
Probability 
Percentage Change in 
Amount 
Variables   
Number of other Migrants =  k -13.39 -28.95 
Bad State Measure = π−1  5.99 12.97 
 
 
This finding raises questions concerning the consequences of the trade-off 
between migration and per migrant remittances in developing countries. One additional 
migrant leaving the labor exporting country decreases per migrant remittances by a 
number close to 13%. This negative relationship might have unanticipated effects on the 
overall impact of migration and remittance on the original country. For instance, the 
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finding in Adams and Page (2005) that an increase in both international migration and 
remittances decrease poverty in developing countries might not hold anymore.  
One interesting finding across both approaches is the robustness of the migrant 
gender variable. In all equations (including the Probit equations) female migrants seem 
to remit more than male migrants. In the Nicaraguan sample female migrants constitute 
more than 47% of the total migrants’ population. This gender neutrality makes the 
remitting behavior across gender an interesting topic. Following Vanwey (2004) I 
further investigate the gender heterogeneity in the migrant behavior. Table 3.12 repeats 
the same estimation approaches while limiting the sample to male and then female 
migrants.  
 
Table 3.12 
Estimates for Eq. (3.14) with Different Specifications: Male versus Female  
            Average Model   Limited Sample 
            Male  Female   Male  Female 
Number of other Migrants =  k -1.8871***  -1.1680***   -0.2868***  -0.2178*** 
 (0.3846)  (0.2200)   (0.0462)  (0.0589) 
Bad State Measure = π−1  0.2501  0.7544**   -0.1093  0.6097** 
 (0.3844)  (0.3708)   (0.2160)  (0.2611) 
         
Likelihood -376.39  -363.94   -787.17  -713.53 
Sample 400  370   290  265 
Note: 1- The bad state measure is the first proxy used under column (1) in Tables 3.10a and 3.10b. The 
same results are found using the second measure of the bad state but they are not reported here. 2-* 
denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. 3- Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 4- All the equations in this table include the same set of covariates in Tables 3.10a and 3.10b.  
 
 
In all cases the coefficient on the number of other migrants k  is negative and 
significant. However the coefficient on the bad state measure π−1  is only positive and 
significant for female migrants. The results seem to point out that male migrant do not 
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really respond to an income shock at the receiving household. However, female migrants 
respond to the same income shock and their response falls under the altruistic model 
predictions. Table 3.12 suggests that female migrants have a different remitting 
behavior.  
3.6. Conclusion  
This chapter presents a theoretical model of migrants' remitting behavior. I 
consider two main motivations towards remitting: altruism and self-interest. This chapter 
contributes to the remittances literature by investigating the reaction of remittances to a 
bad state outcome on the receiving household rather than on the migrant. The remittance 
literature has focused on studying the remittance behavior in regards to a bad outcome 
shock to the migrant which leads to an ex-ante risk-sharing behavior. In this chapter 
migrants do not expect monetary transfers from the original households. This 
assumption is consistent with the data evidence from poor developing countries.  
In the theoretical predictions of the model a pure altruistic migrant receives direct 
satisfaction from the welfare of the original household. The total supply of remittances 
enters the receiving household consumption function and therefore the migrant’s utility 
function. On the contrary pure self-interest motivated migrants do not receive 
satisfaction from the welfare of the receiving household. The theoretical predictions 
suggest that the number of other migrants who belong to the same receiving household 
has a negative effect on remittances in the case of altruistically motivated migrants and 
no effect at all on the self-interest driven migrants. Also the probability of a good state in 
the receiving country which affects the level of income in the receiving household has a 
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negative effect on remittances for an altruistic migrant and again no effect for a self-
interest motivated migrant.  
I test the findings of the theoretical model with data from Nicaragua. I use a 2001 
LSMS data and define two proxies for the bad state outcome and find some empirical 
evidence supporting altruism as a main motivation behind remittances in Nicaragua.  
The results here are in accord with Agarwal and Horowitz (2002). The number of other 
migrants belonging to the same household seems to play a crucial role in determining the 
remittance behavior.  I also test the gender heterogeneity of the remitting behavior and 
find supporting evidence that female migrants seem to behave more altruistically than 
their male counterparts.  
Remittances can be motivated by pure altruism without any economic aspirations 
but they can also be self motivated in terms of an implicit contract between the original 
household and the migrant which includes for example inheritance plans. In the former 
case migrants belonging to the same original household together insure that the original 
household is not in financial need and therefore an increase in the number of migrants is 
expected to decrease remittances per migrant. In the latter case there is no clear 
connection between the number of migrants and remittances since migrants act by self-
interest. From policy perspective and in the case of altruistically motivated remittance, to 
maximize remittances per migrant, labor exporting countries can work on incentives for 
keeping potential migrants from joining other household members. Therefore sending 
countries’ governments can affect remittances per migrant by targeting potential 
migrants. These governments need to be aware of the existing trade-off between the 
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number of migrants belonging to the same receiving household and remittances per 
migrant. One potential policy interest is to find the optimal k  that maximizes 
remittances per migrant.  
Finally, researchers such as Hoddinott (1994) model remittances and migration 
as a family decision. From that point of view there is some concern regarding the 
endogeneity of the number of other migrants. This concern raises questions pertaining to 
the choice of instruments and their validity. This forms the next step in research.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE EFFECTS OF REMITTANCES ON A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 
 
4.1. Introduction  
Remittances have been on the rise for the last several decades. International 
estimates of official remittances flows suggest that the total amount of remittances 
received by developing countries has reached 167 billion U.S. dollars in 2005, up by 
73% from 2001 (World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects). Moreover, remittances 
constitute a significant share of some countries’ gross domestic product or GDP 
(Neyapti, 2004; Heilmann, 2006). The apparent increase in remittances may in part be 
attributed to the rapid growth of money transfer institutions, making the money flows 
more visible, by decreasing the average transaction cost of remitting.  However, another 
part of the increase in measured remittances is an indication of an actual increase in 
these monetary flows, and remittance flows have grown from only satisfying basic needs 
to providing durable goods for the recipient households. 
Remittances gain their significance not just from their size but from the potential 
and actual effects of these money flows on both the society and the individual. 
Remittances affect labor market decisions, school retention levels, export sector 
competitiveness, and create moral hazard problems (Funkhouser, 1992; Glytsos, 2002; 
Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Chami et al., 2005). 
The increasing volume of monetary remittances has led to an interest in studying 
the effects of remittances. Several studies have documented that for several developing 
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countries total remittances already exceed foreign aid and compete in size with foreign 
direct investment or FDI (Connell and Brown, 2004; De Haas, 2006; Heilmann, 2006; 
Chami et al., 2006). While FDI flows are assumed to be profit driven and therefore 
considered as a source of development, the increase in remittances also has the potential 
to promote economic growth through higher domestic demand.  
Remittances may be motivated by many factors.  Lucas and Stark (1985) look at 
remittances as motivated by either altruism or self-interest. The principal motivation 
behind remittances may have important implications for the effect of remittances on 
output in the recipient country. Some researchers believe that altruistically motivated 
remittances are countercyclical with domestic output; others consider remittances as 
procyclical with domestic output when they are mainly motivated by self-interest plans.  
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  Fig. 4.1. Trends of FDI and Remittances for a sample of Latin American Countries 
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Fig. 4.1 indicates the increasing importance of remittances in select Latin 
American countries, comparing remittances and FDI as shares of GDP. The sample 
includes Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Panama, and Peru.  Remittances have surpassed FDI in magnitude starting in 
1999, and remittances have been growing while FDI is shrinking. 
Most of the remittance literature focuses on the microeconomic implication of 
such flows, for the sender or the receiver of these funds.  The literature on the 
macroeconomic impact of remittances on the recipient country is sparse. This chapter 
explores the impact of remittances flows on output, consumption, interest and exchange 
rates in the recipient country. In particular, I explicitly model remittances in a small open 
economy and analyze the impact of shocks to money, remittances and output.  I expand a 
limited participation model that requires that money balances be held to finance certain 
types of purchases and agents incur adjustment costs on money holdings. These two 
requirements generate a large and persistent liquidity effect consistent with the stylized 
facts (Hairault et al., 2004). The impact of the adjustment costs on the predetermined 
allocation of money cash available for consumption is then analyzed to see how the main 
real variables of the economy respond to a remittances shock. 
One of the contributions of this chapter is the ability to examine the dynamic 
response of major macroeconomic variables to remittances shock. Another important 
contribution is the capacity to observe the impact on the main economic variables when I 
allow for different end uses of remittances, and monetary injections. In fact, many 
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domestic governments are interested in developing policy tools to direct a portion of 
remittances towards investment (DeParle, The New York Times Magazine April 22, 
2007). I distinguish between the direct effect of remittances on output through 
investment and the indirect effect through consumption and its multiplier effect. Being 
able to distinguish the end use of remittances is crucial in looking at the final effect on 
output in the economy (Burgess and Haksar, 2005; Heilmann, 2006; Sayan, 2006). 
Finally, this chapter also presents a welfare analysis of remittances shock and 
investigates how remittances affect the utility of the representative agent.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a brief 
summary of the literature review. Section 4.3 formulates a theoretical model. Section 4.4 
discusses the results and section 4.5 summarizes and concludes.  
4.2. Literature Review   
Residents of labor exporting countries receive substantial annual flows of 
remittances. Countries like India and Mexico each received documented remittances of 
more than 9 billion U.S. dollars in 2001 (IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook 2001).  
Fig. C.1 in Appendix C shows that remittances were 40% of GDP in Guatemala by 
2004, approaching 15% in Honduras, above 8% in Ecuador, and over 30% in El 
Salvador.  Even in larger economies such as Mexico remittances approached 1% of GDP 
by 2004. One common characteristic of remittances in all these ten Latin American 
countries is the continuous increase of remittances relative to GDP. In fact, except for 
Bolivia and Brazil, remittances seem to show a stable increase in percentage of GDP 
between 1990 and 2004.  
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Durand et al. (1996) argue that remittance can stimulate the economic activity 
both directly through investment and indirectly through consumption. Even if the large 
percentage of remittances is used for private consumption, some smaller portion is used 
in productive investment. When applied to large sums of remittances this investment 
portion may be significant. Furthermore the authors argue that large use of remittances 
for consumption stimulates the demand for goods and services in the receiving country, 
leading to increases in production, employment and disposable income. 
 Widgren and Martin (2002) include remittances with FDI and foreign aid as 
possible sources of accelerating economic growth, although they warn about the nature 
of remittances.  Remittances are not profit driven and are often thought to be intended to 
mitigate the burden of poor economic performance on the local recipients.  Chami et al. 
(2005) also suggest that remittances are compensatory in nature, and document a 
negative correlation between remittances and GDP growth. 
Heilmann (2006) argues that remittances differ from other capital flows. 
Remittances consist of a transfer of ownership between two individuals to increase the 
recipients’ disposable income.  Further, remittances are not evenly distributed. Heilmann 
outlines the case for remittances promoting a sustainable level of development but also 
warns of potential inflation due to stimulation of internal demand for imports due to 
remittances.  
Chami et al. (2006) develop a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that 
includes government policies to study the implication of remittances for monetary and 
fiscal policies in the recipient country. They explore the behavior of a subset of real and 
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nominal variables in remittance-dependent economies and in economies where 
remittances are not significant.  The authors demonstrate that optimal monetary policy 
will differ between the remittance-dependent economy and an economy with no 
significant remittances.   
The literature seems to present two opposing positions concerning the effects of 
remittances on the economy of the receiving country (Keely and Tran, 1989; Leόn-
Ledesma and Piracha, 2004; De Haas, 2006). On one hand, remittances do increase the 
standard level of living of receiving households.24  These flows of funds are spent on 
consumption, health and education.  On the other hand, remittances are mainly spent on 
consumption and rarely directly invested in productive projects. Remittances increase 
dependency and may increase economic instability.  
In the following section I develop a theoretical model to investigate the effects of 
remittances on key variables in a small open economy.  
4.3. Theoretical Model   
This section presents a limited participation model that requires money balances 
be held to finance certain types of purchases, and agents incur an adjustment cost when 
altering their money holdings.  This model has been used to rationalize a large and 
persistent liquidity effect.  I assume that any monetary shock occurs after households 
have decided on their deposit balances, and therefore these will generate a liquidity 
effect.  However, this is not sufficient to yield a persistent liquidity effect, so I also 
introduce an adjustment cost on cash money holdings, .   ctM
                                                 
24 Djajić (1986) and (1998) show that remittances can also increase the welfare of all residents in the labor 
exporting countries not just those receiving positive amount of remittances.  
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I model the cost of changing money holdings similarly to Hairault, Patureau, and 
Sopraseuth (2004), who take into account the time spent on reorganizing the flow of 
funds.  The adjustment cost equation is given by: 
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The cost of adjusting money holdings implies that bank deposits would not 
change significantly following a monetary shock, and consequently, the firm will have 
more funds to absorb as the decrease in the interest rate is stronger and more persistent. 
Given uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) this large and persistent fall in the interest rate 
differential generates an overshooting in the exchange rate in accord with the stylized 
facts. The model is described in detail in the following subsections. 
4.3.1. Timing of Decisions 
I model a small open economy that includes a representative consumer-household, 
a goods-producing firm, a central bank, and a financial intermediary.  The model takes 
into consideration markets for goods, labor, loanable funds, foreign assets, and money.  
Within each period the timing of decisions follows these five stages: 
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 At the end of period 1−t  the representative household decides the amount of 
deposits and also the amount of cash it wants to hold during the next period.  
When the household chooses these variables, deposits ( ) and cash ( ), it 
does so taking into account that changing money cash holdings ( ) is costly. 
b
tM
c
tM
c
tM
 At the beginning of period t , migrants living abroad remit funds to agents in the 
small open economy. After observing the remittances flow, the Central Bank 
decides on a monetary injection in order to achieve its desired level of money in 
the economy. 
 The credit market then opens. Bank deposits are available in quantity M  and 
the firm determines its demand for capital and labor to produce an internationally 
identical good. The firm borrows from the financial intermediary to finance the 
needed investment for production. 
b
t
 The perfectly competitive goods market then opens, and both production and 
purchasing decisions are made. 
 Finally, the foreign asset market opens at the end of the period, and the 
representative household makes its decision to purchase or sell foreign assets, 
with returns given by the exogenous world interest rate. Labor gets paid at this 
stage, and firms pay off their loans to the financial intermediary. As the 
household owns the bank and the firm, household receive dividend payments 
from the bank and firm as part of household income. 
I assume that the evolution of money follows the time line presented below, with 
the flow of remittances ( ) occurring before the Central Bank decides on the monetary ℜ
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injection ( X ) necessary to achieve the desired monetary growth ( M ) of the small open 
economy. Consequently, the money growth rate is a function of the remittances flow into 
the economy.  
M
ℜ
Pt
∑∞
=0t
t-1           t           t+1 
 
                                        1−tM tM ttt XM +=+1
                         1−t tℜ  
              tX  1−tX
4.3.2. Structure of the Model 
The goods market is characterized by perfect competition, as the domestic firms 
and the rest of the world compete in the production of an identical good, whose price in 
domestic currency is given by . Therefore the law of one price holds. Letting e denote 
the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, and keeping in mind that the 
small open economy assumption implies that the price of the good in foreign currency 
(
tP t
*P ) and the foreign interest rate ( i ) are exogenous, then purchasing power parity is 
given by: 
*
                                                                         (4.2) *Pet=
4.3.2.1. The Household 
The representative agent’s objective is to choose a path for consumption and 
asset holdings to maximize 
                                                                                                             (4.3) ),( tt
t LCUβ
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where C  is consumption and L  is leisure hours. I normalize the time endowment to 
unity, so leisure is given by L
t t
ttt H Ω−−= 1 where  is hours worked and tH tΩ  
represents the time spent adjusting money balances. To facilitate calibration of the model 
I assume a parametric utility function. The per-period utility function is a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility as in Christiano (1991), given by  
                 [ ]σ
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where γ  is the relative weight of leisure and σ  defines the inverse of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution with 0>σ  and 10 << γ . 
When the goods market opens, in the fourth stage, the cash-in-advance (CIA) 
constraint takes the form: 
                                                                  (4.5) tt
c
ttt XMCP ϕφ +ℜ+≤
where  denotes the amount of cash hold by the household for consumption purchases 
at the beginning of the period, ℜ  is the amount of money received as remittances by 
the household, and  is the amount of money being injected by the central bank. Here 
c
tM
t
tX
φ  and ϕ   are parameters that take values between 0 and 1, the first one determining the 
percentage of remittances available for consumption (as opposed to being held as bank 
deposits) and the second one determining the percentage of the monetary injection 
available for consumption (as opposed to being first channeled through the financial 
 78
intermediary).25 These parameters allow us to change the channel in which remittances 
and monetary injections affect the economy, and to see how the end use of remittances 
and monetary injections matter.   
The household can hold foreign assets that yield a risk-free nominal interest rate  
.  In each period the household buys foreign assets B (denominated in the foreign 
currency). Because these foreign assets are denominated in the foreign currency, the 
nominal exchange rate becomes a key variable in the portfolio decision of the household. 
*i 1+t
The household budget constraint is given by: 
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Thus at time t the household determines consumption C  and labor supply , as well as 
the amount of money deposited in banks, , the amount of money kept as cash, , 
and the foreign asset position . Household income is determined by the real wage , 
and the profits (or dividends) received at the end of the period from the firm and the 
bank,  and .  The nominal interest rate on deposits is given by . 
t tH
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The household’s maximization problem can be represented by the value function                            
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25 I introduce φ  to allow for the possibility of policies that induce (force) agents to keep a certain amount 
of remittances as deposits (increasing funds available for investment) and ϕ  to allow for different 
channels through which money is injected by the central bank, helicopter drops directly to households or 
through banks. 
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subject to the cash-in-advance constraint (4.5) and the budget constraint (4.6). Letting tλ  
denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint, the first order 
necessary conditions for the household’s choice of consumption, labor, money deposits, 
money-cash holdings, and foreign assets take the form 
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Eq. (4.7) requires equality between the costs and benefits of bank deposits, while 
Eq. (4.8) requires equality between the marginal disutility of working and the marginal 
benefit – the real wage multiplied by the Lagrange multiplier.  Eq. (4.9) requires equality 
of the current marginal cost of buying foreign assets (in terms of wealth) with the gains 
in the following period from holding such assets today, and Eq. (4.10) equates the costs 
and benefits related to the choice made at time t of money holdings available for 
consumption in the following period. It is clear that if the adjustment costs are zero 
(ξ =0) then Eq. (4.10) will just equate the household’s cost of holding money in the 
current period to the marginal utility of consumption in the following period, properly 
discounted. However, when adjustment costs exist ( 0≠ξ ), the household will compare 
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the cost of changing money holdings (cash) today to the benefits accrued in the next 
period with respect to the purchasing power of money holdings and the in-advance time 
saved rearranging the household portfolio. 
4.3.2.2. The Firm 
The production technology of the firm is given by the Cobb-Douglas function: 
                 Y                                           (4.11) αα −= 1ttzt HKe t
where ]1,0[∈α  and K is physical capital. The firm’s objective is to maximize the 
discounted stream of dividend payments, where I consider the value of this discounted 
dividend stream to its owner, the household.  Thus the firm’s decision trades off paying 
dividends at the end of the current period versus reinvesting those dividends in physical 
capital of the firm.  The firm receives its profits at the end of the period, so the firm 
borrows funds from the bank to invest in physical capital at the beginning of the period, 
with the cost of borrowing given by the nominal interest rate .  Consequently, the 
profits of the firm are given by
tR
26: 
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with investment evolving according to the law of motion of the stock of physical capital, 
                 ttt KKI )1(1 δ−−= +                               (4.13) 
where δ  is a constant rate of depreciation. The decision about the use of dividends, 
either payments to households or reinvestment in the firm, is captured by the ratio of the 
multipliers associated with the budget constraint of the household in the value function 
                                                 
26 Note that I assume that firms can only borrow for incremental investments, which need to be paid off 
completely by the end of the period. 
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(see Eq. (4.7)), as it reflects the consumer’s variation in wealth. The value function of 
the firm is then: 
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Note that the discount factor 
t
t
λ
λβ 1+  can be written as [ , illustrating 
the fact that the appropriate discount rate is time varying and reflects the market- 
determined interest rate.  
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The first order necessary conditions for the household’s choice of labor and 
capital take the form: 
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Eq. (4.15) indicates that the cost of hiring an additional worker should equal that 
worker’s marginal productivity, and Eq. (4.16) requires equality between the cost and 
benefit of the marginal investment. 
4.3.2.3. The Central Bank 
In each period the economy’s monetary authority first observes the remittances 
flow and then injects a given amount of money into the loanable funds market, X .  
Thus the money stock evolves according to: 
t
                                                                      (4.17) ttt XMM +=+1
where the Central Bank’s money injection is defined as 
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                 ttt MX )1( −= θ                                           (4.18) 
and where tθ  represents the monetary growth factor, itself possibly a function of the size 
of the remittances flow. Eq. (4.17) indicates that money growth in the economy depends 
on the existing stock of money M  and the monetary injection implemented by the 
Central Bank .  
t
tX
The monetary growth factor tθ   is allowed to respond to remittances flows 
(sterilization, etc.) and is written as: 
                 1,1 )log()log()log()1()log( ++ +++−= ttgtt g θθθ ερθρθρθ               (4.19) 
I also define  as the growth factor for remittances, which evolves according to 
the first order autoregressive process: 
tg
                 1,1 )log()log()1()log( ++ ++−= tgtggt ggg ερρ                                       (4.20) 
and I specify the shock to the production function in its usual form: 
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Here 1, +tgε , 1, +tθε , and 1, +tzε  are white noise innovations with variance , , 
and , respectively. 
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4.3.2.4. The financial Intermediary 
At the beginning of the period, the commercial bank (financial intermediary) 
receives deposits from the household , receives a portion of remittances as deposits, btM
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and receives a portion of the monetary injection from the monetary authority, X .t
27 
These funds are then available for lending to the firm to pay for the firm’s investment in 
physical capital. At the end of the period, the firm repays its loans, and the bank returns 
deposits to the household along with the appropriate interest payment.  
The bank’s asset balance is given by: 
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where  are the loans made to the firm and the right hand side lists sources of funds 
including deposits, a portion of remittances, and a portion of the monetary injection. 
tt IP
Bank profits per period are equal to the interest on loans minus interest paid on 
deposits and on remittances deposited in banks.  Note that the monetary injection 
directly into banks is a subsidy to the bank in that there is no interest on those funds: 
                                (4.23) tt
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Putting both expressions together results in profits of the intermediary depending 
only on the money injection provided by the monetary authority: 
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b
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4.3.2.5. Closing the Model 
 To complete the model specification I combine both Eqs. (7) and (9) to define an 
uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP):   
                                                 
27 The deposit amount from remittances could be zero if the total amount of remittances received is 
immediately disbursed to the agent such that it will just add to money-cash available for consumption.  
The monetary injection  is a helicopter drop with the additional condition that (i) can be injected into 
the financial intermediaries at the beginning of the period, they can lend it out, and then are distributed to 
the households, together with the earned interest, (ii) can be injected directly to the household for 
consumption, or (iii) any combination of (i) and (ii). 
tX
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I model a small open economy with international assets freely traded, so a no-arbitrage 
condition leads to UIP.   
Finally to close the model I need a specific form for remittances.  I assume that 
remittances are based on the income of the receiving economy, and I further assume that 
remittances are negatively correlated with income deviations from the steady state.  Thus 
remittances increase when the receiving country experiences an economic downturn.  
The specification follows Chami et al. (2006), and is written as: 
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A special case of interest would be 0=τ , so that remittances respond only to the 
domestic price level and the growth rate . For values of g 0>τ remittances react to the 
state of the recipient economy. Remittances increase with poor economic performances 
in the receiving country.   
4.3.3. Equilibrium 
The system’s equilibrium is characterized by the set of prices and quantities: 
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and the vector of exogenous foreign variables { .  Given these prices and 
quantities, the set of quantities 
}, ** iP
CΩ  maximizes the household’s expected intertemporal 
utility subject to (4.5) and (4.6), the set of quantities QΩ  maximizes the profits of the 
firm subject to (4.11) and (4.14), and the set of prices PΩ  ensures that the labor market, 
the loanable funds market, and the money market all clear while satisfying purchasing 
power parity. 
Note that the household can hold any quantity of foreign assets that it finds 
optimal, subject only to its budget constraint.  From Eq. (4.6) and market equilibrium I 
can infer that foreign asset holdings evolve according to: 
                                   (4.28) tttttttttt RICYPBieBe ℜ−+−+−−=+−+ ))1)(1(1()()1( *1 φ
Eq. (4.28) relates domestic production and absorption to an economy’s foreign 
asset position, giving the balance of payments equilibrium. If a country’s production is 
greater than its absorption, that country has a balance of trade surplus and a negative 
capital account, so its foreign asset holdings will increase. 
The set of equations given by the first order conditions, the market equilibriums, 
and the laws of motion for physical capital, domestic money supply, foreign assets, and 
the monetary growth factor constitute a non-linear dynamic stochastic system. The 
system of equations is presented in the Appendix C together with the log-linearized 
system following Uhlig’s (1999) methodology. To solve this system I calibrate certain 
basic parameters and find the steady state values of the relevant variables to characterize 
the long-run equilibrium of the economy.   
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4.3.4. Calibration and Steady State Equilibrium 
The calibration of the standard parameters is based in part on Hairault et al. 
(2004), supplemented with specific parameters I derive from a sample of countries used 
for this study: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Panama, and Peru.  
Table 4.1 lists the values of the basic parameters.  The first column includes three 
parameters that follow standard calibration values.  The capital shareα  is set to 0.36.  
The subjective discount factor β  is set at 0.988, implying a real interest rate equal to 
1.2% per quarter.  The deprecation rate on capital δ  is set to roughly 2.5% per quarter.  I 
set the parameter γ  to 0.70, which implies that the representative household devotes 
80% of its time endowment to non-working activities. The remaining parameters are 
derived from data from the sample of ten Latin American countries covering the period 
1990 to 2004.  The data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database. The parameter v represents the average of the trade balance to GDP, and is 
used to determine the long-run real debt-to-GDP ratio in the steady state calculation. The 
long run inflation factor is given by π , and is based on the average inflation factor of the 
countries in my sample. I set the average money growth rate parameter θ  to 1.0380 
which implies 3.8% inflation per quarter. Remittances are calibrated to be 5% of GDP. 
The persistence coefficient of the remittance’s shock, gρ , and the standard deviation of 
the remittance’s innovation, gσ , are obtained from regressions on the remittance’s base 
of the countries in the sample.  Similarly, the persistence coefficient of the monetary 
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shock, θρ , and the standard deviation of the monetary innovation, θσ , are obtained 
from regressions on the adjusted monetary base of the countries in the sample.28  Finally, 
I calibrate the technology shock, persistence and variance, to match the parameters of 
Chami et al. (2006).  
10=
I explicitly consider three values for the adjustment cost parameterξ .  I examine 
the benchmark case of no adjustment cost, 0=ξ  and also the cases of a small but 
positive adjustment cost, 1=ξ  to allow for the liquidity effect and of a larger adjustment 
cost ξ  which represents around four minutes per week of lost time rearranging the 
portfolio (Karame et al., 2003).  
 
Table 4.1  
Model Calibration Values  
      
     
     
0=α 70.0=γ 055.1=g36. 5814.0=gρ 022.0=gσ
0012.0=ϑ 038.1=θ 95.0=zρ988.0=β 007.0=zσ
99.0=φ 01558.0=θσ63.0=θρ025.0=δ 03.0−=v
 
 
The equations are written to describe a stationary system and are presented in 
Appendix C. Nominal variables are made stationary by dividing them by the lagged 
domestic price level. The main variables are: 
                  111111 ;;;; −−−−−− ℜ=Γ==== tttttttttttbtbtttt PPBebPPPMmPMm π  
                                                 
28 The relevant monetary base is the country’s monetary base minus the monetary inflows of remittances, 
such that the Central Bank decides on the monetary growth after it sterilizes the monetary inflows. 
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In order to evaluate the implications of the positive exogenous shock in the 
limited participation model, different adjustment costs are introduced to observe the 
behavior of the nominal interest rate, output, nominal exchange rate, and consumption 
following such shocks, both in terms of impulse response functions as well as in 
quantitative terms. 
4.3.4.1. Steady State Equilibrium 
In this section, I outline the calculation of steady state equilibrium values for the 
remaining variables.  Obviously adjustment costs disappear in the steady state, and 
steady state values do not need time subscripts.  In the long-run equilibrium I assume the 
domestic inflation rate is given by the money growth rate, see Eq. (C.62) in Appendix C, 
so that θπ = .  
In the steady state the domestic and foreign inflation levels are the same, so Eq. 
(C.57) implies that the change in the nominal exchange rate
1−
=
t
t
e
e
e∆  is constant and 
equal to unity.  Consequently the uncovered interest rate parity condition implies that the 
domestic and the foreign interest rates are equal ( ).  Finally, combining Eqs. 
(C.52) and (C.54) and, after some manipulation, I have that the domestic nominal 
interest rate in steady state is 
*iR =
                 1−= β
πR  
I can derive the steady state level of remittances from Eq. (4.26) as 
                  ϑπ=Γ  
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To find the steady state capital/output ratio (denoted κ ) I get, from the 
stationarity of Eq. (C.61):                                                                                                                               
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Then from the production function I can solve for the output/labor ratio: 
                 α
α
κ −= 1
H
Y  
which can be used in Eq. (C.60) to solve for the real wage: 
                 
H
Yw )1( α−=  
Solving for H in Eq. (C.51), and substituting Λ  from Eq. (C.54), I can solve for 
the consumption/output ratio: 
                 

 −= −− α
α
κπγ
β 11
Y
w
Y
C  
Letting πφ
Γ−+−+−−= ))1)(1(1( RICYTB  to be the domestic trade balance, 
and using the calibration for YTBv = , I obtain the long-run real debt-to-GDP ratio that 
is equal to the domestic trade balance as a share of GDP: 
                 νπ ==


 +−
Y
TBi
Y
b *11  
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This and Eq. (C.64), together with the capital/output ratio, allows us to write the steady 
state output as: 
                  
[ ] ( )
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Then the steady state physical capital stock will be given by YK κ= , and the steady 
state investment rate will be given by KI δ= .  
The steady state stock of foreign assets in real terms is derived from the balance 
of payments equilibrium (C.64), so the household’s stock of foreign assets in real terms 
is: 
                  vY
i
b

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Consequently, the steady state consumption level is given by: 
                 biIRYC 


 +−−−Γ−+−+= ππφ
*11))1)(1(1(  
Given that real money balances is defined by Eq. (C.55), its steady state level is:  
                   cb mmm +=
            Combining Eqs. (C.56) and (C.63), the steady state for real money balances is:                           
               ICm +Γ−= θ
1  
Then using (C.56), the household’s steady state deposit balances are: 
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The marginal utility of wealth in the steady state is given by 
                 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )π
γβ σγγσγ −−−− −−=Λ
11 11 HC  
The steady state values of these variables are presented in Table 4.2, under two 
alternative calibrations of remittances: remittances equal to 5% of GDP, and remittances 
equal to 10% of GDP.  
 
Table 4.2  
Steady State Values 
 Remittances 5% GDP Remittances 10% GDP 
 
Nominal Interest Rate  
Capital/output ratio  
Output  
Remittances  
Capital  
Investment  
Bonds  
Consumption  
Real Money Balances  
Real Money deposits  
Real Money Cash  
Real Wages  
Lambda  
Labor (hours worked) 
Inflation 
Utility 
Trade Balance 
 
0.0506 
2.3062 
0.3264 
0.0161 
0.7529 
0.0188 
0.7848 
0.3325 
0.3358 
0.0066 
0.3292 
1.0240 
0.8588 
0.2040 
0.0380 
99.5112 
-0.0095 
 
0.0506 
2.3062 
0.3140 
0.0322 
0.7242 
0.0181 
0.7549 
0.3357 
0.3228 
0.0062 
0.3166 
1.0240 
0.8505 
0.1963 
0.0380 
99.5208 
-0.0091 
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The nominal interest rate is 5.06% per quarter in either instance, and the capital 
output ratio is unaffected by the level of remittances. The inflation rate is only dependent 
on the steady state money growth rate, and thus independent of the level of remittances. 
Output is affected somewhat by remittances, and falls almost 4% when remittances rise 
from 5% to 10%.  This occurs because the capital stock and labor hours worked are also 
about 4% lower.  Meanwhile consumption is higher by about 1% which implies that a 
permanent increase in remittances results in households choosing more leisure while also 
having more consumption. The representative agent’s utility slightly increases 
suggesting that remittances are beneficial for households. However, remittances do not 
necessarily lead to an increase in steady state domestic production. Finally, remittances 
have a positive impact on the trade balance since the trade deficit falls by 4% when the 
percentage of remittances to GDP is doubled.  
4.4. Results   
Given the steady states values from the previous section, I analyze the aggregate 
dynamics of the nominal interest rate, output, the nominal exchange rate, and 
consumption following expansionary monetary, technological, and remittances shocks. I 
examine such dynamics under the assumption that remittances depend on the level of 
output of the receiving economy, thus being endogenously determined. Also, the model 
with no adjustment costs does not generate the large and persistent liquidity effect 
observed in the data, therefore I introduce a small but positive adjustment cost ( 1=ξ ) to 
generate this effect.  In addition, I investigate a more realistic adjustment cost ( 10=ξ ) 
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equivalent to losing four minutes per week rearranging money deposits.  A small open 
economy views foreign variables as constant. 
The model presented in this chapter allows a variety of specifications for the 
percentage of remittances going to consumption and investment, and similarly for the 
monetary injection.  However, the main dynamics can be observed in the baseline 
specification, with remittances used almost entirely for consumption ( 99.0=φ ) and the 
monetary injection going through the financial intermediary for investment ( 0=ϕ ).  
Therefore, in the interest of a concise exposition, I present only the impulse responses 
for this case for all three types of shocks, monetary, technology and remittances shocks. 
Henceforward, I refer to this case as the baseline case.  I briefly discuss at the end of 
each section how different assumptions on the distribution of remittances and monetary 
injections, between consumption and investment, affect the responses of the main 
variables studied here.  
The results presented below are those assuming that the elasticity of substitution 
is equal to one. In Section 4.5, I discuss the role of the elasticity of substitution in more 
details.  
4.4.1. Monetary Shock 
The impulse response functions presented in this section are those following a 
1% increase in the home money growth factor in period 0, under the assumptions 
described above.  Hereafter the cases with no adjustment costs are illustrated with solid 
lines, the case with the small adjustment cost ( 1=ξ ) is presented with dashed lines, and 
the case with the larger adjustment cost ( 10=ξ ) is presented with dot lines.  
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4.4.1.1. Nominal Interest Rate Response 
The monetary injection leads to a rise in the nominal interest rate, increasing on 
impact by 2.5 basis points and peaking on the third quarter with 5 basis points higher 
than steady state when there is no adjustment cost ( 0=ξ ), which is in accord with the 
positive response in the typical CIA models. By introducing adjustment costs I am able 
to generate the observed liquidity effect, with the monetary shock leading to a drop in 
the interest rate, falling by 14 basis points when the adjustment cost is small ( 1=ξ )  and 
by 50 basis points when there is a larger adjustment cost ( 10=ξ ).  At the time the shock 
occurs, the increased monetary injection increases the money supply, increasing inflation 
and putting downward pressure on the nominal interest rate because households cannot 
withdraw their deposits within the period.  This is the liquidity effect, and its persistent 
effect on the interest rate can be observed below in Fig. 4.2. 
Response to a one percent deviation in monetary shock
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Fig. 4.2.  Nominal Interest Rate Dynamics following a Monetary Shock 
 
The monetary shock raises inflation momentarily, which reduces the value of real 
money balances and induces households to increase their holdings of money cash the 
following period to satisfy their consumption level, thus reducing its money deposits 
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( ). The magnitude of the drop in the interest rate is determined by the cost of money 
adjustments. However, even if the household reduces its money deposits the following 
period, the liquidity effect is persistent because firms raise their investment the period of 
the shock to take advantage of the lower interest rate and in anticipation of the relatively 
lower money supply that would result from the expected deposit withdrawals. This 
increased investment results in a larger capital stock, which lowers its marginal 
productivity, and forces firms to reduce their demand for loans more than the 
household’s reduction of money deposits the following period, maintaining the nominal 
interest rate below its steady state level and producing a persistent liquidity effect. 
b
tM 1+
4.4.1.2. Output Response 
The output dynamics following a monetary shock are in accord with the 
dynamics observed in the data, but as the adjustment cost increases the recovery in 
output is stronger and its peak is delayed, with output peaking after three quarters in the 
case of the smaller adjustment cost and after five quarters in the case of the larger 
adjustment cost. After an initial decline below its steady state level resulting from the 
instantaneous fall in labor, the subsequent increase in labor and the increase in the 
capital stock resulting from the greater investment lead to an increase in output, as 
shown in Fig. 4.3. The initial fall in output gets larger as a bigger adjustment cost is 
accounted for.   
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         Fig. 4.3. Output Dynamics following a Monetary Shock 
 
The expansionary monetary shock generates a positive wealth effect, which 
increases leisure in the first period because of the cash-in-advance constraint and 
adjustment cost of money holdings. However, from the second period onwards, when 
there are no adjustment costs the increase in real wages induce agents to increase labor 
above the initial steady state level, which combined with the surge in capital starting 
from the second period due to the lower cost of investment explains the increase in 
output in the short run. When adjustment costs are positive and as large as 10, work 
hours recover more strongly, which together with the surge in investment leads to 
increase capital the following period, lead to higher levels of output observed in the 
graph above. 
4.4.1.3. Nominal Exchange Rate Response 
In the case of no adjustment cost, the monetary injection causes the typical 
continuous depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. After the introduction of positive 
adjustment costs, the monetary injection leads to the instantaneous fall in the nominal 
interest rate, reducing the return on domestic savings, and inducing households to hold 
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more foreign assets. This leads to an instantaneous depreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate on impact, depreciating by 3.2% on impact when there is smaller adjustment cost 
( 1=ξ ), and by 6.5% when there is the larger adjustment cost ( 10=ξ ). The 
overshooting of the nominal exchange rate shown in Fig. 4.4 is due to the uncovered 
interest rate parity (Eq. (4.25)), which requires the interest rate differential to be equal to 
the expected rate of appreciation, leading to the subsequent appreciation until it reaches 
its new steady state, as the liquidity effect is expected to be persistent. 
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                          Fig. 4.4. Nominal Exchange Rate Dynamics following a Monetary Shock 
 
The overshooting of the nominal exchange rate is accentuated by the size of the 
adjustment costs, as it creates a larger and persistent liquidity effect that requires a more 
accentuated appreciation. In fact, the higher ξ  the more limited the withdrawal of 
private deposits, the farthest the fall in the interest rate, and the larger the initial 
depreciation of the exchange rate. Also, even if agents respond to the below-steady-state 
domestic interest rate with a continuously increase in their holdings of foreign bonds, the 
initial overshooting of the exchange rate is strong enough to allow for the subsequent 
appreciation, even if the demand for the foreign asset is still rising. 
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4.4.1.4. Consumption Response 
The consumption dynamics following a monetary injection is primarily generated 
from the inflationary pressure during the period of the shock. Given that the 
consumption level is determined by the cash-in-advance constraint, and since the amount 
of money-cash can not be changed during the period of the shock, the inflation generated 
by the larger money supply reduces consumption instantaneously, mimicking the inverse 
dynamics of inflation with no adjustment costs, but returning to steady state more 
monotonically with positive adjustment cost. The consumption dynamics after the shock 
arises from the rearrangement between money-cash and money deposits. Since agents 
anticipate inflation, and in order to preserve their consumption in the future, households 
increase their future amount of nominal money cash the period of the shock ( ). 
However, while it is relatively inexpensive to change the ratio 
c
tM 1+
c
t
c
t
M
M 1+ when there are no 
adjustment costs, thus adjusting consumption quickly, this ratio would adjust smoothly 
when there are adjustment costs, inducing persistence in the adjustment of consumption. 
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     Fig. 4.5. Consumption Dynamics following a Monetary Shock 
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This model allows considering the influence, if any, of the channel by which 
remittances first impacts the economy.  I can induce remittances to first end up in the 
hands of households as cash, loosening the cash in advance constraint.  I can also direct 
some portion of remittances to end up in banks as deposits, which in the period of impact 
will mean additional funding available for bank loans to fund firm investment.  
However, the impact of a monetary shock is not significant in this modeling choice.  The 
method by which remittances first enter the economy has almost nothing to do with the 
responses of the economy to a monetary shock.   
This model also allows considering the influence, if any, of the channel by which 
a monetary injection first impacts the economy.  I consider monetary injections that are 
basically helicopter drops on households, loosening the cash in advance constraint, and 
helicopter drops on banks.  As the fraction of a monetary injection that is initially 
channeled through the financial intermediary is reduced, so that monetary injections 
directly fall to households and hence impact household consumption, the impulse 
response functions show very similar patterns that vary only slightly in magnitude but 
not in qualitative impact or in timing.29  For example, as the fraction of the monetary 
injection that goes to the household for consumption increases, the response in the 
nominal interest rate and the exchange rate overshooting are reduced in magnitude, 
while the output and consumption responses are also reduced in magnitude, with the 
                                                 
29 Results are available upon request. 
 100
‘hump’ in the output response also slightly delayed.  These smaller dynamic responses 
also occur if the fraction of remittances available for consumption is reduced.   
These results found here are similar to those obtained in related papers (i.e. 
Hairault et al., 2004; Chari et al., 2001; Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992). 
4.4.2. Technology Shock 
I now analyze the behavioral response of the main macroeconomic variables to a 
positive 1% technology shock using the baseline specification.  
4.4.2.1. Nominal Interest Rate Response 
The introduction of the technology shock has a direct effect on output, which 
outweighs the fall in inflation to put upward pressure on the nominal interest rate. On 
impact, the nominal interest rate increases by 90 basis points when there is no 
adjustment cost ( 0=ξ ), and increases by 1.16 full point when there is the smaller 
adjustment cost ( 1=ξ ) and by 1.4 full point in the case of the larger adjustment cost 
( 10=ξ ). The increase in output brought about by the technology shock lowers inflation 
and raises consumption the period of the shock, which fuels an important increase in 
investment to raise physical capital. This higher demand for loans exerts the pressure to 
raise the nominal interest rate above its initial steady state level as shown below in Fig. 
4.6. 
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Response to a one percent deviation in technology shock
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                  Fig. 4.6. Nominal Interest Rate Dynamics following an Output Shock 
 
 
The dynamics of the nominal interest rate after the period of the shock is 
determined by the adjustment of money cash balances. When there is no adjustment cost, 
the period fallowing the shock is still dominated by the further increase in investment to 
satisfy the above-steady-state consumption level, and while the rise in inflation 
contributes to the continuous upward pressure on the interest rate, the larger increase in 
money deposits exerts a stronger pressure on the opposite direction, forcing the nominal 
interest rate down. The fall of the interest rate towards its steady state continuous 
thereafter as investment, inflation, and money deposits returns to their initial steady state 
levels. These dynamics are also observed for the case of positive adjustment cost, but the 
nominal interest rate returns to the initial level at a much lower pace, which is mainly do 
to the much smaller increase in money deposits, whose continuous increase for couple 
more periods is enough to outweigh the much lower decline in investment. 
4.4.2.2. Output Response 
The technology shock increases output by almost 1.8% on impact, irrespective of 
the existence of adjustment costs or not. The positive impact on physical capital is 
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reinforced by the increase in hours worked fueled by the rise in real wages. Since these 
two factors are the main determinants of the production function, their rise results in an 
increase in output that continues for another 10 quarters, peaking at almost 3.5% above 
the initial steady state level before starting to decline. These subsequent dynamics arise 
from the continuous increase in both physical capital and hours worked during these 
quarters, with the increase in physical capital being fueled by the above-steady-state 
levels of investment and the increase in labor supply being brought about by the direct 
effect on the real wage. 
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         Fig. 4.7. Output Dynamics following an Output Shock 
 
The positive effect on output is in accord with existing analyses of technological 
shocks, with its long lasting effect being determined by the continuous investment 
brought about by the large increase in money deposits that outweighs the higher than 
steady state interest rate. 
4.4.2.3. Nominal Exchange Rate Response 
The initial nominal exchange rate response to the positive technology shock is 
determined by the rise of the nominal interest rate, which is only partially neutralized by 
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the fall in inflation. The nominal exchange rate appreciates by 2.8% on impact when 
there are no adjustment costs ( 0=ξ ), by 3.5 when there is a small adjustment cost 
( 1=ξ ) and by 5.5% when there is a larger adjustment cost ( 10=ξ ), as shown in Fig. 
4.8. The overshooting of the exchange rate is governed by the uncovered interest rate 
parity condition that requires that the interest rate differential is equal to the expected 
rate of depreciation, which is accentuated when there is a positive adjustment cost. Since 
the increase in the nominal interest rate is expected to be persistent ( ), the 
persistent positive interest rate differential generates the expected further depreciation of 
the exchange rate ( ). 
01 >+tt RE
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Fig. 4.8. Nominal Exchange Rate Dynamics following an Output Shock 
 
From a balance of payments perspective, the above steady state domestic interest 
rate induces agents to reduce the holdings of foreign bonds, forcing the initial 
appreciation in the process. As the domestic interest rate return to its initial level, the 
rearrangement of foreign bonds gets reversed, with the resulting higher demand for 
foreign bonds pressuring the nominal exchange rate upwards and producing its 
continuous depreciation. The higher the adjustment cost the slower return of the nominal 
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interest rate to its initial level, causing a larger and longer fall in the demand for foreign 
bonds. 
4.4.2.4. Consumption Response 
The effect of the positive shock to technology on consumption is primarily 
determined by the cash-in-advance constraint, which is mainly influenced by the 
inflation dynamics and the flexibility to adjust the money balances. In the period of the 
shock, and since the amount of money-cash can not be changed during the period, the 
fall in inflation is almost fully translated in an increase in consumption, rising by almost 
2.7% when there are no adjustment costs, by almost 3.5% when there is a small 
adjustment cost and by almost 5.5% in the case of the larger adjustment cost. However, 
the consumption dynamics following the period of the shock are affected by other 
factors. In the case of no adjustment costs, while consumption drops immediately in 
response to the rise in inflation to levels above the initial steady state, the downward 
pressure lowers consumption to a level below the initial steady state. This drop in 
consumption gets reversed from the second period onwards, as higher money cash 
holdings get reinforced by the return of inflation to steady state levels, giving way to a 
monotonic increase in consumption that leads to a higher steady state consumption level. 
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Response to a one percent deviation in technology shock
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Fig. 4.9. Consumption Dynamics following a Technology Shock 
 
The consumption dynamics following the period of the shock are much more 
stable when there is a positive adjustment cost, which is clearly expected when the 
milder adjustment in money balances is taken into account. In this case, while the 
inflation dynamics are only enhanced, the fact that money cash is brought back to its 
initial steady state level only slowly allows for levels of consumption above steady state 
return to the initial steady state at the same rate than money cash. This is why 
consumption falls only monotonically and slowly in this case. 
The effect of the positive technology shock on the model is in accord with the 
existing literature, with the representative agent being able to increase output and 
consumption, which raises the domestic nominal interest rate and allows agents to 
reduce their holdings of foreign bonds at least in the short run, which produces the initial 
nominal exchange rate appreciation described above. These results are robust to the 
alternative distributions of remittances and monetary injection, as described in the 
monetary shock section, and the dynamics are only affected by small changes in 
magnitude.  
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4.4.3. Remittances Shock 
Since continuous remittances flows can alter the behavior of the representative 
household, I analyze the behavior of the main macroeconomic variables to a remittances 
shock.  As modeled in Eq. (4.19), the monetary growth factor is assumed to respond to 
remittances flows, and consequently it is also affected by the remittances shock. 
4.4.3.1. Nominal Interest Rate Response  
The introduction of a remittances shock also increases the money supply through 
the monetary growth specification, although to a much lower degree, and consequently 
also raises inflation momentarily during the period of the shock. This higher inflation 
produces a continuous depreciation of the nominal exchange rate for no adjustment cost 
or small adjustment cost, and an overshooting of the nominal exchange rate when the 
adjustment cost is larger, leading to an increase in the interest rate in the first case and a 
fall in the interest rate in the second case. 
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                         Fig. 4.10. Nominal Interest Rate Dynamics following a Remittances Shock 
 
The dynamics of the nominal interest rate after the period of the shock are 
governed by the dynamics of investment and money deposits. When there is no 
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adjustment cost ( 0=ξ ), the recovery in investment combined with the reduction in 
money deposits in the subsequent period further increases the nominal interest rate. 
However, as investment continues to return to its steady state level in the following 
periods, real money deposits recover at a faster pace, thus creating downward pressure 
on the nominal interest rate that continues from then on. When there is a large positive 
adjustment cost ( 10=ξ ), the increase in investment in the period following the shock, 
combined with the reduction in money deposits, exerts a positive pressure on the 
nominal interest rate, which is counteracted by inflation below steady state, so that the 
nominal interest rate is almost unchanged from its previous level.  It is only when money 
deposits also start to recover that there is upward pressure on the nominal interest rate. In 
fact, both investment and money deposits bounce back to levels above their initial steady 
state four quarters after the remittances shock, and inflation rises slowly back to its 
steady state level, forcing the interest rate to rise back to its original level monotonically, 
creating a persistent liquidity effect. 
4.4.3.2. Output Response 
The remittances shock decreases output irrespective of the existence of 
magnitude adjustment costs, but its long term dynamics are affected by the adjustment 
cost. When there is no adjustment costs the remittances shock slightly decreases the real 
wage in the period of the shock, raising the amount of time spend working, and as the 
capital stock is fixed, output also increases slightly. However, since labor further 
declines in the next two periods, as well as the capital stock, output decreases. This 
decline in labor and capital is only reversed four quarters after the remittances shock, 
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partly in response to the recovery in the real wage and partly in response to investment 
above steady state levels, increasing both labor and physical capital, and consequently 
monotonically raising output.  
Response to a one percent deviation in remittances shock
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        Fig. 4.11. Output Dynamics following a Remittances Shock 
 
When adjustment costs are introduced into the model I observe a slight decrease 
in output during the period of the shock, which is due to a small fall in labor resulting 
from the slight increase in the real wage. In fact, as the real wage falls for the next four 
quarters, labor also falls and combined with the fall in the capital stock, decreases output 
in the next four quarters and as the real wage and investment recover so does labor and 
capital allowing the output to recover in the long term. It is worth noting that the initial 
downward pressure gets relieved as adjustment costs increase which is due to the smaller 
fall of investment that arises from the higher adjustment costs. 
4.4.3.3. Nominal Exchange Rate Response 
The initial exchange rate response to a positive remittances shock is mainly 
determined by the inflationary pressure emanating from the monetary growth factor 
specification, which leads to a proportional depreciation of the exchange rate on impact. 
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In particular, the positive 1.7% deviation from steady state in inflation is directly 
translated in a 1.7% depreciation from steady state in the nominal exchange rate when 
there are no adjustment costs, while in the case of a positive adjustment cost, a 2.4% 
deviation from steady state in inflation is directly translated in a 2.4% depreciation from 
steady state in the nominal exchange rate for the smaller adjustment cost, and a 5.3% 
deviation from steady state in inflation is directly translated in a 5.3% depreciation from 
steady state in the nominal exchange rate for the higher adjustment cost. This is shown 
in Fig. 4.12 below. 
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                        Fig. 4.12. Nominal Exchange Rate Dynamics following a Remittances Shock 
 
Note that while subsequent dynamics are determined by the uncovered interest 
rate parity condition, they are dependent on the existence of adjustment costs. When 
there is no or very small adjustment costs ( 6<ξ ) the increase in the nominal interest 
rate resulting from larger fall in real money deposits is expected to be persistent 
( 0 ), and this persistent positive interest rate differential in counterbalanced by 
the expected further depreciation of the exchange rate ( ). When I 
1 >+tt RE
0ˆˆ 1 >−+ ttt eeE
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introduce a larger positive adjustment cost ( 10=ξ ), and with a liquidity effect that is 
expected to be persistent, the continual negative interest rate differential ( 01 <+tt RE ) is 
counterbalanced by the expected appreciation of the nominal exchange rate in this case 
( 0 ), given rise to an overshooting of the exchange rate. ˆˆ 1 <−+ ttt eeE
=φ
The remittances shock induces agents to hold more foreign bonds in both cases, 
following interest parity condition. With no or small adjustment costs, the initial rise in 
the domestic interest rate gets outpaced by the return on foreign bonds brought about by 
the depreciation of the exchange rate, thus inducing agents to increase their holdings of 
foreign bonds the first few periods after the shock, but then starts to slowly decline as the 
interest rate returns to its initial level while the exchange rate continues to depreciate at a 
much slower rate. In the case of the larger positive adjustment costs, the increase in 
foreign bonds is accentuated by the fall in the domestic interest rate during the period of 
the shock, but it then decelerates as the domestic interest rate begins to rise while the 
return on foreign bonds decreases as the exchange rate appreciates.  
4.4.3.4. Consumption Response 
The consumption dynamics following a remittances shock are primarily 
generated from the inflationary pressure during the period of the shock, which emanates 
from the monetary growth factor specification discussed above. Even if remittances are 
assumed to go in its entirety for consumption ( 99.0 ), the increase in inflation by 
1.7% the period of the shock (when there is no adjustment cost) and the fall in real 
money cash depress consumption by 1.6%, but then it quickly recovers the following 
period and ends up slightly below the initial steady state level. However, when I 
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introduce the smaller adjustment cost, the increase in inflation is two times larger, which 
outweighs the increase in remittances and fall in real money cash, resulting in a fall in 
consumption of about 2.2% while the increase in inflation is almost three times larger in 
the case of the larger adjustment cost which from the same pressure makes consumption 
5% below its initial steady state level. The dynamics show consumption rising 
monotonically as a result of the subsequent fall in inflation to below-steady state levels 
and the recovery in both real money balances and money cash. This recovery is strong 
enough to pull consumption back to its original steady state, as shown below in Fig. 
4.13. 
Response to a one percent deviation in remittances shock
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  Fig. 4.13. Consumption Dynamics following a Remittances Shock 
 
These dynamics can be explained by the rearrangement of money cash and 
money deposits. When there are no adjustment costs, the representative household 
reduces real money cash the period following the remittances shock, enough to outweigh 
the greater consumption power brought by the remittances shock, but in the following 
periods it quickly increases money cash holdings while inflation drops, allowing the 
household to start consuming at levels slightly below the steady state.  
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When there are adjustment costs, the reduction of real money cash the period 
following the remittances shock is much larger and outweighs the positive remittances 
shock.  While it then increases monotonically, it stays below its initial steady state for 
the rest of the periods being investigated, as consumption does. 
When the amount of remittances and money injection used for consumption and 
investment is altered, the resulting dynamics are similar to those reported here, differing 
only in magnitude.30  In particular, as I lower the amount of remittances available for 
consumption, the nominal interest rate response becomes smaller. Output responses also 
show these dynamics, becoming smaller as I increase the fraction of remittances used for 
investment. The consumption’s dynamic response also becomes smaller, dropping below 
steady state for a period, but then quickly recovering and staying close to the initial 
steady state level as I increase the fraction of remittances used for investment, while the 
nominal exchange rate dynamics after the initial depreciation also slowly turns to a small 
appreciation as the fraction of remittances used for investment increase. All these 
dynamic responses are also affected by the size of the adjustment costs, becoming more 
pronounced as adjustment costs increase but maintaining their qualitatively effects. 
To further investigate these relative small responses to various distributions of 
remittances and monetary injections for consumption and investment, I also allow for 
remittances to be 10% of GDP, a magnitude that reflects a doubling in importance of 
remittances in the receiving economy. However, there are no major changes in the 
                                                 
30 Results are available upon request. 
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responses of all variables and their dynamics are somewhat stable across different 
adjustment cost magnitudes.   
4.4.4. Welfare Analysis 
While the impact of a remittances shock on the main macroeconomic variables of 
the small open economy provides an adequate understanding of its effect at the macro 
level, its overall impact on the welfare of the representative agent is still somewhat 
allusive. In order to obtain the agent’s welfare gain from a remittances shock, I now 
analyze the utility of the representative agent under the previous cases. In the case 
assuming that remittances are 5% of GDP, the steady state utility is 99.5112 while when 
remittances are 10% of GDP the steady state utility increases to 99.5208. When I 
introduce the positive 1% remittances shock utility falls in the period of the shock by 
0.005% when there is no adjustment cost, by 0.02% when I introduce the smaller 
adjustment cost, and by 0.8% when I introduce the larger adjustment cost.31 However, 
while utility bounces back in all cases to levels above its initial steady state level, as 
shown below in Fig. 4.14, the discounted utility with a positive remittances shock never 
reaches levels above the discounted utility without remittances shock for the time span 
examined, for all adjustment cost cases. 
 Nevertheless, when remittances are 5% of GDP, the per period utility rises 
above the initial utility level after three quarters in the case of no adjustment cost, and 
peaking after five quarters before starting to decline, but rises and peaks in a level above 
the initial utility value after one quarter when the adjustment cost is the largest. When 
                                                 
31 The utility dynamics for the larger positive adjustment cost are available upon request.  
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remittances are 10% of GDP the per period utility rises above the initial utility level after 
three quarters in the case of no adjustment cost, and peaking after eight quarters before 
starting to decline, but rises and peaks in a level above the initial utility value after one 
quarter when the adjustment cost is the largest.  
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       Fig. 4.14. Utility Dynamics following a Remittances Shock 
 
While in the period of the shock I observe a decrease in utility in all the cases 
above, utility quickly recovers to levels above steady state, allowing the discounted 
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utility to recover to levels closer to the discounted utility levels of the small open 
economy that does not experiences a remittances shock. Also, the impact of the 
introduction of adjustment costs in the discounted utility deteriorates welfare, 
irrespective of the share of remittances relative to output. This is expected since it is a 
restriction in the adjustment of money balances, so agents can not quickly rearrange their 
consumption portfolio.  
4.4.5. Intertemporal Elasticity of  Substitution  
In the cases discussed above σ is equal to one. However, the results in accord 
with Christiano (1991) emphasize the importance of the response of worked hours on the 
output response. For that matter, I discuss the role of the inverse of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution and investigate the cases when 5.0=σ and 5.1=σ .   
From Section 4.3.4.1, only the marginal utility of wealth Λ  (lambda) depends on 
σ . Therefore the steady state values in Table 4.2 do not change except for lambda which 
decreases when σ  increases.  
As for the aggregate dynamics, when 5.0=σ  or for that matter 1<σ then 
 suggesting that an increase in consumption decreases the marginal utility of 
hours worked and therefore hours worked decrease. In this case consumption and hours 
worked are complements since the cross-price elasticity is negative. When the elasticity 
of substitution is greater than 
0<
ttCH
U
1>σ , consumption and hours worked are substitutes since 
.  0>
ttCH
U
Therefore, in Figs. 4.5 and 4.13 the immediate drop in consumption due to 
monetary and remittances shocks has different effects on hours worked depending on the 
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value of σ . Fig. 4.15 shows the response of output to a remittances shock under 10=ξ  
for both cases 5.0=σ  and 5.1=σ . The immediate drop in consumption leads to an 
instantaneous increase in output following the increase in hours worked (labor) for 1<σ . 
In the case of  1>σ  the drop in consumption leads to an immediate decrease in output 
following the immediate drop in hours worked. However, the increase in capital in the 
following quarter outweighs the reduction in labor and causes output to increase.  
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Fig. 4.15. Output Dynamics following a Remittances Shock with 10=ξ  
 
This cycle is robust irrespective of the presence and the magnitude of the 
adjustment cost.  
4.5. Conclusion  
The limited participation model for a small open economy with remittances 
explicitly incorporated is able to capture important features from observed empirical 
responses of economic variables to monetary shocks.  In particular, I capture important 
aspects in the dynamic response of the nominal interest rate, output, the exchange rate, 
and consumption.  The introduction of adjustment costs on money holdings accentuate 
the persistence of the liquidity effect, and consequently expands the overshooting 
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dynamics of the nominal exchange rate, both in accord with existing empirical evidence 
on the result of monetary innovations. The technology shock results are also in accord 
with existing findings, in particular with those regarding the overshooting exchange rate 
appreciation in response to a positive shock.  
A novel contribution of this chapter comes from the ability to examine the 
dynamic response of major macroeconomic variables -- namely the nominal interest rate, 
output, the nominal exchange rate, and consumption -- to remittances shocks.  I find that 
a remittances shock in the model without adjustment costs will increase the nominal 
interest rate, decrease output and consumption, and cause a small but continuous 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.  When there are positive adjustment costs the 
dynamic response of the nominal interest rate is reversed in sign and increased in 
magnitude.  The response of output is diminished while that of consumption is 
magnified, with the size of the adjustment cost. Here consumption smoothly returns to 
its initial steady state due to the adjustment cost on money balances. In addition, 
adjustment costs produce the expected overshooting depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate.  
Furthermore, I investigate the impact of different modeling assumptions with 
respect to the initial impact of remittances on the economy, whether to loosen the cash in 
advance constraint facing households or to increase the supply of loanable funds at 
financial intermediaries.  I find that these alternative specifications have scant impact on 
the dynamic responses of the variables I examine to a monetary shock, but these 
alternatives do affect the dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables to a 
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remittances shock. The size of the adjustment cost magnifies the influence the 
remittances shock, but not the direction. For policy implications, the results in this 
chapter suggest that altering the end use of remittances does not have a major impact on 
the main macroeconomic variables as a whole, therefore policies that aim at redirecting 
the use of remittances might have no real effect on the recipient economy.  
Perhaps more important is the welfare response to a positive remittances shock. I 
find that utility falls as a result of a positive remittances shock irrespective of the 
existence of adjustment costs or the share of remittances in the economy, but it quickly 
recovers to levels above the initial utility level and remains higher thereafter. This means 
that while the positive remittances shock has a negative effect on utility the period of the 
shock, the negative effect slowly decreases as future utility is discounted.   
I also examine the impact of a change in remittances on the steady state of the 
economy.  As remittances are doubled as a percentage of the recipient country’s output, 
both output and work hours fall by almost 4% while consumption increases by slightly 
more than 1%. Physical capital also falls by almost 4%. The distribution of real money 
balances also becomes affected by the doubling of the share of remittances, with real 
money cash decreasing by almost 4% while real money deposits decrease by almost 4%. 
It can be observed that the representative household increases its leisure as the share of 
remittances increases, which together with the fall in physical capital reduces output. 
This negative effect is counterbalanced by the increase in consumption brought about by 
the doubling of remittances.  
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This chapter has assumed remittances as endogenously determined by the 
recipient country’s output. For future research it would be interesting to investigate the 
case where remittances are exogenous determined only by their growth rate. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In recent years remittances have gained international spotlight. Migrant 
remittances can affect the performance of the economy as a whole and can also impact 
the behavior at the household level. One way to develop economic policies that take full 
advantage of these money flows is to understand the remitting behavior.  
Chapters II and III of this dissertation study the remitting behavior of 
Nicaraguans using a survey data conducted in 2001. Particularly, in Chapter II I 
investigate what affects the probability and amount of remittances. In Chapter III, I 
examine what drives migrants from Nicaragua to remit.   
  In Chapter I, I estimate a heteroskedastic Tobit with a known form of 
heteroskedasticity to capture both the probability of remitting and the levels of 
remittances. Gender, labor force status and destination of the migrant along with the 
nuclear family all have significant effects on the remitting behavior. The labor force 
status and the education level of the head of the receiving household influence the 
migrant’s decision to participate in the remitting behavior.  
 Both foreign and domestic migration policies are likely to have significant effects 
on remittances to Nicaragua since these policies are likely to affect the destination, labor 
status, and the composition of the emigrant pool.  
In addition, migrants belonging to the same receiving household seem to make 
decisions concerning remittances in accordance with other migrants in the same 
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household. I find evidence supporting a positive correlation between migrants’ remitting 
decisions. For policy makers this is of great significance. Remittance policies that 
directly target particular migrants are also expected to affect the remittance decisions of 
other migrants belonging to the same receiving household. The full effect of such 
policies can be separated into direct effect through the main policy objective and an 
indirect effect through the significant correlation between the remitting decisions.  
Also, this direct correlation introduces a set of hypotheses on the remitting 
decisions. Migrants within the same receiving household might be competing, behaving 
in the same manner based on their shared background or simply implementing an ex-
ante agreement. It is not very clear from the results in this chapter which model of 
household behavior is supported (collective versus unitary) (Browning and Chiappori, 
1998). Also it is not obvious whether the remitting decisions of migrants belonging to 
the same receiving household should be modeled as a cooperative process (ex-ante 
agreement). More evidence from other data sets is needed in order to investigate this set 
of hypotheses. 
Chapter III presents a theoretical model of migrants' remitting behavior. I 
consider two main motivations towards remitting: altruism and self-interest. In the 
theoretical predictions of the model, a pure altruistic migrant receives direct satisfaction 
from the welfare of the original household. On the contrary pure self-interest motivated 
migrants do not receive satisfaction from the welfare of the receiving household. The 
theoretical predictions suggest that the number of other migrants who belong to the same 
receiving household has a negative effect on remittances in the case of altruistically 
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motivated migrants and no effect at all on the self-interest driven migrants. Also the 
probability of a good state in the receiving country which affects the level of income in 
the receiving household has a negative effect on remittances for an altruistic migrant and 
again no effect for a self-interest motivated migrant.  
I test the findings of the theoretical model with data from Nicaragua. I use a 2001 
LSMS data and define two proxies for the bad state outcome and find some empirical 
evidence supporting altruism as a main motivation behind remittances in Nicaragua.  
The number of other migrants, k , belonging to the same household seems to play a 
crucial role in determining the remittance behavior.  I also test the gender heterogeneity 
of the remitting behavior and find supporting evidence that female migrants seem to 
behave more altruistically than their male counterparts.  
From policy perspective and in the case of altruistically motivated remittance, to 
maximize remittances per migrant, labor exporting countries can work on incentives for 
keeping potential migrants from joining other household members. Therefore sending 
countries’ governments can affect remittances per migrant by targeting potential 
migrants. These governments need to be aware of the existing trade-off between the 
number of migrants belonging to the same receiving household and remittances per 
migrant. One potential policy interest is to find the optimal k  that maximizes 
remittances per migrant.  
Finally, there is some concern regarding the endogeneity of the number of other 
migrants. This concern raises questions pertaining to the choice of instruments and their 
validity and definitely sets the stage for more research.  
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Chapter IV uses a limited participation model for a small open economy with 
remittances explicitly incorporated to capture important features from observed 
empirical responses of economic variables to monetary shocks.  In particular, I capture 
important aspects in the dynamic response of the nominal interest rate, output, the 
exchange rate, and consumption. The introduction of adjustment costs on money 
holdings accentuate the persistence of the liquidity effect, and consequently expands the 
overshooting dynamics of the nominal exchange rate, both in accord with existing 
empirical evidence on the result of monetary innovations. The technology shock results 
are also in accord with existing findings, in particular with those regarding the 
overshooting exchange rate appreciation in response to a positive shock.  
A novel contribution of this chapter comes from the ability to examine the 
dynamic response of major macroeconomic variables -- namely the nominal interest rate, 
output, the nominal exchange rate, and consumption -- to remittances shocks.  I find that 
a remittances shock in the model without adjustment costs will increase the nominal 
interest rate, decrease output and consumption, and cause a small but continuous 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.  When there are positive adjustment costs the 
dynamic response of the nominal interest rate is reversed in sign and increased in 
magnitude.  The response of output is diminished while that of consumption is 
magnified, with the size of the adjustment cost. Here consumption smoothly returns to 
its initial steady state due to the adjustment cost on money balances. In addition, 
adjustment costs produce the expected overshooting depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate.  
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Furthermore, I investigate the impact of different modeling assumptions with 
respect to the initial impact of remittances on the economy, whether to loosen the cash in 
advance constraint facing households or to increase the supply of loanable funds at 
financial intermediaries.  I find that these alternative specifications have scant impact on 
the dynamic responses of the variables I examine to a monetary shock, but these 
alternatives do affect the dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables to a 
remittances shock. The size of the adjustment cost magnifies the influence the 
remittances shock, but not the direction. For policy implications, the results in this 
chapter suggest that altering the end use of remittances does not have a major impact on 
the main macroeconomic variables as a whole, therefore policies that aim at redirecting 
the use of remittances might have no real effect on the recipient economy.  
Perhaps more important is the welfare response to a positive remittances shock. I 
find that utility falls as a result of a positive remittances shock irrespective of the 
existence of adjustment costs or the share of remittances in the economy, but it quickly 
recovers to levels above the initial utility level and remains higher thereafter. This means 
that while the positive remittances shock has a negative effect on utility the period of the 
shock, the negative effect slowly decreases as future utility is discounted.   
I also examine the impact of a change in remittances on the steady state of the 
economy.  As remittances are doubled as a percentage of the recipient country’s output, 
output, work hours and physical capital fall while consumption slightly increases. It can 
be observed that the representative household increases its leisure as the share of 
remittances increases, which together with the fall in physical capital reduces output. 
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This negative effect is counterbalanced by the increase in consumption brought about by 
the doubling of remittances.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1  
Variance of the Error Term from the Average Model 
Number of Remitting Migrants 
js  
Average Model 
))1(1(1)( 2 ρσ −+= j
j
jAM ss
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0 2σ  
1 2σ  
2 ( )ρσ +1
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1 2  
3 ( )ρσ 21
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1 2 +  
4 ( )ρσ 31
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1 2 +  
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7 ( )ρσ 61
7
1 2 +  
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Table A.2 
Variables Descriptive Statistics: Average Model with Sample Size equal to 661 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Remittances Logarithm of Monthly Remittances measured in 2001 U.S. Dollars 1.29 1.61 0 6.22 
1 if Age between 
21 and 30 
Age of the Migrant, equal to 1 if migrant is 
between 21 and 30 years old. 0.36 0.46 0 1 
1 if Male Gender of the Migrant, equal to 1 if migrant is a male. 0.52 0.47 0 1 
1 if Education 
less than 4 Years 
Education of the Migrant, equal to 1 if 
migrant’s education is less than 4 years. 0.47 0.48 0 1 
1 if Working Labor Status, equal to 1 if migrant is working 0.78 0.40 0 1 
1 if Emigrant 
Resides in D.C. 
Destination of the migrant, equal to 1 if 
migrants live in developed countries. 0.30 0.45 0 1 
1 if Years since 
Migration less 
than 4 
Number of Years the migrant has been 
living out of Nicaragua, equal to 1 if the 
number of years is less than 4 years. 
0.52 0.48 0 1 
1 if Spouse of 
the Head of the 
Household 
Relationship of the migrant to the head of 
the household, equal to 1 if the migrant is 
the spouse of the head of the household. 
0.05 0.22 0 1 
1 if Parent of the 
Head of the 
Household 
Relationship of the migrant to the head of 
the household, equal to 1 if the migrant is 
the parent of the head of the household. 
0.03 0.17 0 1 
1 if Child of the 
Head of the 
Household 
Relationship of the migrant to the head of 
the household, equal to 1 if the migrant is 
the child of the head of the household. 
0.59 0.48 0 1 
1 if Urban 
Residence 
Resident of the migrant’s Receiving 
Household, equal to 1 if it resides in an 
urban area 
0.72 0.44 0 1 
1 if Education of 
the Head of 
Household is 
less than 4 Years 
Education of the Head of the Household, 
equal to 1 if Head of the Household’s 
education is less than 4 years. 
0.75 0.43 0 1 
1 if Head of the 
Household 
Working 
Status of the head of the Household, equal 
to 1 if head of the household working. 0.63 0.48 0 1 
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Migrant 2 Table A.3 
Migrants’ Strategies for Two 
Households Migrants Remit Not Remit 
Remit 58.0 % 12.0 % 
Migrant 1 
Not Remit 7.0 % 23.0 % 
Note: The sample consists of 200 migrants who belong to two migrants’ 
households which is around 24% of the total migrants’ population and 36% of 
the total multiple households’ migrants’ population.  The numbers in the table 
consist of the number of incidence. 
 
 
Migrant 3 
Remit Not Remit 
Migrant 2 Migrant 2 
Table A.4 
Migrants’ Strategies for Three 
Households Migrants 
Remit Not Remit Remit Not Remit 
Remit 36.6 % 4.9 % 14.6 % 12.2 % 
Migrant 1 
Not Remit 7.3 % 7.3 % 7.3 % 9.8 % 
Note: The sample consists of 123 migrants who belong to three migrants’ households which 
is around 15% of the total migrants’ population and 24% of the total multiple households’ 
migrants’ population.  The numbers in the table consist of the number of incidence. 
 
 
Migrant 4 
Remit Not Remit 
Migrant 3 Migrant 3 
Remit Not Remit Remit Not Remit 
Migrant 2 Migrant 2 
Table A.5 
Migrants’ Strategies 
for Four 
Households 
Migrants 
R NR R NR R NR R NR 
Remit 22.2 % 0.0 % 5.6 % 0.0 % 5.6 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 11.1 % 
Migrant 1 Not 
Remit 11.1 % 5.6  % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 5.5 % 0.0 % 33.3 % 
Note: The sample consists of 72 migrants who belong to four migrants’ households which is around 
9% of the total migrants’ population and 14% of the total multiple households’ migrants’ population. 
The numbers in the table consist of the number of incidence. R = Remit; NR = Not Remit. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
B.1 
 
Derivations of Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7): 
 
From the FOC Eq. (2.5) in the altruism model 
 
( ) 011 =++−++−
−=∂
∂
−iiLHii krrYYrYr
U
ππ
δα  
 
and the implicit function theorem I can write: 
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where Y .  0fLH Y−
For the self-interest model 0=δ  which leads to  0=∂
∂
k
r  and 0=∂
∂
π
r .  
Solving for r  in Eq. (2.5): *i
Eq. (2.5) gives ( ) 011 =++−++−
−
−iiLHii krrYYrY ππ
δα  which leads to 
( ) iiiiLH rYkrrYY δδααπααπ −=++−+ − 11  
and therefore I can write ( ) ( ) iLHii krYYYr −−−−−=+ απααπδδα 11  
and then after rearranging some terms I get to the following: 
 134
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )πδα
α
δα
απδα
α
δα
δ ;;;;11* kYYYrkrYYYYr LHiiLLHii =+−+−−+−+= −  
The utility function is strictly quasi-concave which insures the uniqueness of the solution 
.  *ir
 
B.2 
The likelihood function for the average model is the following where  is 
the number of remitting migrants in household : 
∑
=
=
jk
i
ijj LL
1
ln js
j
( )[ ] ( )[ ]θβγ *1ln1lnln '' XXLij Φ−=Φ−=                                      if               (2.12)     0=js
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where Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and ( ). σθσ
βγ 1; == . 
The likelihood function for the third case ( ) is derived from the likelihood function 
of the second case ( ) with 
1>js
1=js
jσj
βγ = ; 
j
j σθ
1= ; ( )( ) 5.01 jjj hh −+= ρσσ  and 
j
1
j s
h = . I maximize with respect to jL θγ ;  and ρ . 
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Table B.3  
First Stage Probit Estimates for the Sample Selection Estimates on Eq. (2.14) in Table 2.10b  
                    Amount Remitted 
Variables    
Intercept 0.6395*** 
 (0.1864) 
1 if Parent 0.4331 
 (0.3023) 
1 if Spouse 0.6224 
 (0.2434) 
1 if Working -0.2575 
 (0.1119) 
1 if Education less than 4 Years 0.1249 
 (0.1032) 
1 if Male -0.0177 
 (0.0926) 
1 if Age greater than 29 -0.1553 
 (0.1126) 
1 if Destination is Developed Country -0.4801*** 
 (0.1095) 
1 if Years since Migration greater than 5 0.0372 
 (0.1070) 
1 if Urban Residence 0.2512 
 (0.1072) 
1 if Education of HHH less than 4 0.0101 
 (0.1149) 
1 if HHH Male -0.1876 
 (0.0931) 
1 if HHH age is greater than 64 -0.1286 
 (0.1066) 
Log Likelihood -540.00 
Sample  872 
Note: 1- Columns refer to two different measures for the good state probability: column (1) refers to a 
dummy variable for households where the head had lost the last job for one of the reasons discussed in 
Table 2.3. Column (2) refers to a dummy variable for those head of households who have been looking 
for a job for at least one year. 2-* denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. 3- 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Fig. C.1: Remittances as Percentages of GDP for 10 Select Latin American Countries 
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C.2 
I denote the shadow price associated with the household real wealth by ttt Pλ=Λ . The 
relevant equations in the limited participation model are defined the following way: 
[ ]tgttss
t
t eYYE ττ πϑ −=Γ )(                                                                                           (C.27) 
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ttH wU t Λ=−                                                                                                              (C.51) 


 +Λ=Λ +
+
+ )1( 1
1
1
t
t
t
t
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The following variable is introduced for technical convenience: c
t
c
tc
t M
MM 1+≡∆  which can 
be stationarized (to be used in the next equation) as 
c
t
t
c
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11 )log()log()log()1()log( ++ +++−= ttgtt g θθθ ερθρθρθ                                        (C.65) 
11 )log()log()1()log( ++ ++−= gttggt ggg ερρ                                                            (C.66) 
11 )log()log()1()log( ++ ++−= zttzzt zzz ερρ                                                              (C.67) 
Consequently, the log-linearized system of equations, following Uhlig (1999) 
methodology, is given by 
[ ]tttt
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Solving 
The system is given by 19 equations with 19 variables. The endogenous state variables 
{ } include lambda and the nominal exchange rate in addition to the 
standard four variables, as Uhlig’s toolkit suggests that variables dated t  or earlier 
should be considered state variables (in the case of e ) while the matrix of other 
endogenous variables should be non-singular in order for its pseudo-inverse to exists, 
allowing to re-declare Λ  as an other endogenous state variable instead. The other 
endogenous variables of the system are { }, and the 
exogenous state variable are { }. 
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